TY - JOUR

T1 - The Origins of Parliamentary Agenda Control

T2 - A Comparative Process Tracing Analysis

AU - Koß, Michael

PY - 2015/9/3

Y1 - 2015/9/3

N2 - This paper aims to explain the origins of the rules of parliamentary agenda control, which can be regarded as the single most important institutional determinant of parliamentary power. Based on the premises of distributive bargaining, the paper develops a causal mechanism for the delegation of agenda control to the government majority. Given that only anti-system or anti-establishment parties strictly prefer to participate in plenary proceedings, these ‘anti’-parties potentially obstruct legislation. Such legislative obstruction by ‘anti’-parties causes establishment parties to commit themselves to procedural reform and thus triggers attempts to centralise agenda control. The delegation of parliamentary agenda powers is successful if opposition to procedural reform is confined to anti-system parties. The causal leverage of this mechanism is assessed in a process-tracing of three reform attempts in two most different cases: the initially ineffective, but then successful introduction of a closure procedure in the United Kingdom and the failed attempt to facilitate the closure in Germany.

AB - This paper aims to explain the origins of the rules of parliamentary agenda control, which can be regarded as the single most important institutional determinant of parliamentary power. Based on the premises of distributive bargaining, the paper develops a causal mechanism for the delegation of agenda control to the government majority. Given that only anti-system or anti-establishment parties strictly prefer to participate in plenary proceedings, these ‘anti’-parties potentially obstruct legislation. Such legislative obstruction by ‘anti’-parties causes establishment parties to commit themselves to procedural reform and thus triggers attempts to centralise agenda control. The delegation of parliamentary agenda powers is successful if opposition to procedural reform is confined to anti-system parties. The causal leverage of this mechanism is assessed in a process-tracing of three reform attempts in two most different cases: the initially ineffective, but then successful introduction of a closure procedure in the United Kingdom and the failed attempt to facilitate the closure in Germany.

KW - agenda control

KW - causal mechanism

KW - distributive bargaining

KW - Germany

KW - process-tracing

KW - United Kingdom

KW - Politics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84934794632&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/01402382.2015.1045319

DO - 10.1080/01402382.2015.1045319

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:84934794632

VL - 38

SP - 1062

EP - 1085

JO - West European Politics

JF - West European Politics

SN - 0140-2382

IS - 5

ER -