At the mercy of prior entry: Prior entry induced by invisible primes is not susceptible to current intentions

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

Standard

At the mercy of prior entry : Prior entry induced by invisible primes is not susceptible to current intentions. / Weiß, Katharina; Scharlau, Ingrid Rose.

in: Acta Psychologica, Jahrgang 139, Nr. 1, 01.01.2012, S. 54-64.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Bibtex

@article{38019f43be314e828655a95018fdedd0,
title = "At the mercy of prior entry: Prior entry induced by invisible primes is not susceptible to current intentions",
abstract = "If one of two events is attended to, it will be perceived earlier than a simultaneously occurring unattended event. Since 150. years, this effect has been ascribed to the facilitating influence of attention, also known as prior entry. Yet, the attentional origin of prior-entry effects. 11We will further use the term prior-entry effect to distinguish prior entry revealed by experimental paradigms from the attentional interpretation of prior entry, which we will call in the following prior entry only. has been repeatedly doubted. One criticism is that prior-entry effects might be due to biased decision processes that would mimic a temporal advantage for attended stimuli. Although most obvious biases have already been excluded experimentally (e.g. judgment criteria, response compatibility) and prior-entry effects have shown to persist (Shore, Spence, & Klein, 2001), many other biases are conceivable, which makes it difficult to put the debate to an end. Thus, we approach this problem the other way around by asking whether prior-entry effects can be biased voluntarily. Observers were informed about prior entry and instructed to reduce it as far as possible. For this aim they received continuous feedback about the correctness of their temporal judgments. If elicited by invisible primes the effect could not be reduced at all and only by 12. ms if elicited by visible cues. This challenges decision biases as primary source of prior-entry effects - at least if attention is oriented exogenously.",
keywords = "Psychology, prior entry, decision bias, attention, temporal order judgment, time perception, intentions, Educational science",
author = "Katharina Wei{\ss} and Scharlau, {Ingrid Rose}",
note = "Funding Information: We would like to thank the reviewers, Frederic Hilkenmeier and Jan T{\"u}nnerman for helpful comments on previous versions of this manuscript. We thank Birte Lindhorst, Christian Born and Henriette Wei{\ss} for proofreading the manuscript. This research was funded by DFG grants NE 366/7-2 and SCHA 1515/1-1, 1-2 within the ECRP II Programme of the European Science Foundation.",
year = "2012",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.10.007",
language = "English",
volume = "139",
pages = "54--64",
journal = "Acta Psychologica",
issn = "0001-6918",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - At the mercy of prior entry

T2 - Prior entry induced by invisible primes is not susceptible to current intentions

AU - Weiß, Katharina

AU - Scharlau, Ingrid Rose

N1 - Funding Information: We would like to thank the reviewers, Frederic Hilkenmeier and Jan Tünnerman for helpful comments on previous versions of this manuscript. We thank Birte Lindhorst, Christian Born and Henriette Weiß for proofreading the manuscript. This research was funded by DFG grants NE 366/7-2 and SCHA 1515/1-1, 1-2 within the ECRP II Programme of the European Science Foundation.

PY - 2012/1/1

Y1 - 2012/1/1

N2 - If one of two events is attended to, it will be perceived earlier than a simultaneously occurring unattended event. Since 150. years, this effect has been ascribed to the facilitating influence of attention, also known as prior entry. Yet, the attentional origin of prior-entry effects. 11We will further use the term prior-entry effect to distinguish prior entry revealed by experimental paradigms from the attentional interpretation of prior entry, which we will call in the following prior entry only. has been repeatedly doubted. One criticism is that prior-entry effects might be due to biased decision processes that would mimic a temporal advantage for attended stimuli. Although most obvious biases have already been excluded experimentally (e.g. judgment criteria, response compatibility) and prior-entry effects have shown to persist (Shore, Spence, & Klein, 2001), many other biases are conceivable, which makes it difficult to put the debate to an end. Thus, we approach this problem the other way around by asking whether prior-entry effects can be biased voluntarily. Observers were informed about prior entry and instructed to reduce it as far as possible. For this aim they received continuous feedback about the correctness of their temporal judgments. If elicited by invisible primes the effect could not be reduced at all and only by 12. ms if elicited by visible cues. This challenges decision biases as primary source of prior-entry effects - at least if attention is oriented exogenously.

AB - If one of two events is attended to, it will be perceived earlier than a simultaneously occurring unattended event. Since 150. years, this effect has been ascribed to the facilitating influence of attention, also known as prior entry. Yet, the attentional origin of prior-entry effects. 11We will further use the term prior-entry effect to distinguish prior entry revealed by experimental paradigms from the attentional interpretation of prior entry, which we will call in the following prior entry only. has been repeatedly doubted. One criticism is that prior-entry effects might be due to biased decision processes that would mimic a temporal advantage for attended stimuli. Although most obvious biases have already been excluded experimentally (e.g. judgment criteria, response compatibility) and prior-entry effects have shown to persist (Shore, Spence, & Klein, 2001), many other biases are conceivable, which makes it difficult to put the debate to an end. Thus, we approach this problem the other way around by asking whether prior-entry effects can be biased voluntarily. Observers were informed about prior entry and instructed to reduce it as far as possible. For this aim they received continuous feedback about the correctness of their temporal judgments. If elicited by invisible primes the effect could not be reduced at all and only by 12. ms if elicited by visible cues. This challenges decision biases as primary source of prior-entry effects - at least if attention is oriented exogenously.

KW - Psychology

KW - prior entry

KW - decision bias

KW - attention

KW - temporal order judgment

KW - time perception

KW - intentions

KW - Educational science

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84655169596&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/3fa67916-9e4c-3e11-99e2-a86df251f1dc/

U2 - 10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.10.007

DO - 10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.10.007

M3 - Journal articles

C2 - 22099951

VL - 139

SP - 54

EP - 64

JO - Acta Psychologica

JF - Acta Psychologica

SN - 0001-6918

IS - 1

ER -

DOI