Coercion in international tax cooperation: identifying the prerequisites for sanction threats by a great power

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Coercion in international tax cooperation: identifying the prerequisites for sanction threats by a great power. / Hakelberg, Lukas.
In: Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 3, 03.05.2016, p. 511-541.

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@article{3a1d44a2c5474413b5348a28cf036718,
title = "Coercion in international tax cooperation: identifying the prerequisites for sanction threats by a great power",
abstract = "Tax cooperation puts offshore centers worse off, as their compensation for forgone profits is a hard political sell, and unlikely to produce the same spillover effects on wages and employment as the attraction of foreign tax base. Coercion by a great power thus seems to be a prerequisite for successful international cooperation in tax matters. Great power status is based on internal market size. Governments become substantially more likely to use this power through sanction threats against tax havens when two factors coincide: (1) domestic constraints preventing a shift of the tax burden to labor and consumption and (2) scope for redistributive cooperation benefitting great power banks or multinationals. Hypotheses are tested in an analysis of tax negotiations at OECD level between 1996 and 2014.",
keywords = "business power, domestic constraints, FATCA, redistributive cooperation, tax cooperation, Politics",
author = "Lukas Hakelberg",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.",
year = "2016",
month = may,
day = "3",
doi = "10.1080/09692290.2015.1127269",
language = "English",
volume = "23",
pages = "511--541",
journal = "Review of International Political Economy",
issn = "0969-2290",
publisher = "Routledge Taylor & Francis Group",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Coercion in international tax cooperation

T2 - identifying the prerequisites for sanction threats by a great power

AU - Hakelberg, Lukas

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

PY - 2016/5/3

Y1 - 2016/5/3

N2 - Tax cooperation puts offshore centers worse off, as their compensation for forgone profits is a hard political sell, and unlikely to produce the same spillover effects on wages and employment as the attraction of foreign tax base. Coercion by a great power thus seems to be a prerequisite for successful international cooperation in tax matters. Great power status is based on internal market size. Governments become substantially more likely to use this power through sanction threats against tax havens when two factors coincide: (1) domestic constraints preventing a shift of the tax burden to labor and consumption and (2) scope for redistributive cooperation benefitting great power banks or multinationals. Hypotheses are tested in an analysis of tax negotiations at OECD level between 1996 and 2014.

AB - Tax cooperation puts offshore centers worse off, as their compensation for forgone profits is a hard political sell, and unlikely to produce the same spillover effects on wages and employment as the attraction of foreign tax base. Coercion by a great power thus seems to be a prerequisite for successful international cooperation in tax matters. Great power status is based on internal market size. Governments become substantially more likely to use this power through sanction threats against tax havens when two factors coincide: (1) domestic constraints preventing a shift of the tax burden to labor and consumption and (2) scope for redistributive cooperation benefitting great power banks or multinationals. Hypotheses are tested in an analysis of tax negotiations at OECD level between 1996 and 2014.

KW - business power

KW - domestic constraints

KW - FATCA

KW - redistributive cooperation

KW - tax cooperation

KW - Politics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84955064803&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/09692290.2015.1127269

DO - 10.1080/09692290.2015.1127269

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:84955064803

VL - 23

SP - 511

EP - 541

JO - Review of International Political Economy

JF - Review of International Political Economy

SN - 0969-2290

IS - 3

ER -