Dictators don't compete: autocracy, democracy, and tax competition

Research output: Journal contributionsJournal articlesResearchpeer-review

Authors

  • Philipp Genschel
  • Hanna Lierse
  • Laura Seelkopf

It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries worldwide are non-democratic. We explain theoretically why autocracies are less likely to adjust to competitive constraints and test our argument empirically against data on the corporate tax policy of 99 countries from 1999 to 2011.

Original languageEnglish
JournalReview of International Political Economy
Volume23
Issue number2
Pages (from-to)290-315
Number of pages26
ISSN0969-2290
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 03.03.2016
Externally publishedYes