Promote, ignore, pretend: The political economy of regulating tax havens

Research output: Contributions to collected editions/worksContributions to collected editions/anthologiesResearchpeer-review

Authors

This chapter reviews the political science and political economy literature on the failures and successes in the regulation of tax haven activities. We organize the review around four main explanatory factors – interests, ideas, power and institutions. Each adds important insight into our understanding of the cleavages and dynamics of the international regulation of tax havens. Further, most accounts converge in the observation, running counter to the majority discourse in the public domain, that the real cleavage is not between normal tax states and tax havens, but capital interests vs. other, wider societal interests. Future research should focus on the historical emergence of tax havens and their domestic politics.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationResearch Handbook on the Economics of Tax Havens
EditorsArjan Lejour, Dirk Schindler
Number of pages299
Place of PublicationCheltenham
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing
Publication date2024
Pages280
Article number15
ISBN (print)978-1-80392-973-6
ISBN (electronic)978-1-80392-974-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2024

    Research areas

  • Politics - global tax governance, global political economy, international relations, OECD, Tax avoidance, Tax evasion