A threefold meta-analysis of economic first-offer effects in negotiations

Activity: Talk or presentationConference PresentationsResearch

Hannes Petrowsky - Speaker

Yannik Escher - Speaker

Lea Boecker - Coauthor

Marie-Lena Frech - Coauthor

Malte Friese - Coauthor

Brian Gunia - Coauthor

Alice J. Lee - Coauthor

Michael Schaerer - Coauthor

Martin Schweinsberg - Coauthor

Meikel Soliman - Coauthor

Roderick I. Swaab - Coauthor

Eve Sarah Troll - Coauthor

Marcel Weber - Coauthor

David Loschelder - Coauthor

Is it advantageous to move first in a negotiation? Should one make an ambitious first offer? Does first-offer magnitude impact final outcomes? While a plethora of research suggests that these three questions can be answered affirmatively with a remarkable robustness across cultures, countries, and contexts, recent findings are not unequivocally advantageous and range from positive to null to even negative effects. Despite decades of research, a comprehensive meta-analysis of economic first-offer effects and their moderators remains missing. Our preregistered meta-analysis with the robust variance estimation (RVE) approach conceptualized and quantified three empirical first-offer effects on negotiation outcomes: (1) a first-mover advantage (g = 0.49), (2) a first-offer magnitude effect (g = 1.30), and (3) a positive offer-outcome correlation (r = 0.53; g = 1.51). Overall, effect sizes were highly heterogeneous and moderated by publication, sample, negotiation, and first offer characteristics. We discuss theoretical and applied implications for the negotiation literature.


36th Annual Conference of the International Association of Conflict Management


Thessaloniki, Greece

Event: Conference