The too-much-precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts

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The too-much-precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts. / Loschelder, David D.; Friese, Malte; Schaerer, Michael et al.
In: Psychological Science, Vol. 27, No. 12, 12.2016, p. 1573-1587.

Research output: Journal contributionsJournal articlesResearchpeer-review

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Loschelder DD, Friese M, Schaerer M, Galinsky AD. The too-much-precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts. Psychological Science. 2016 Dec;27(12):1573-1587. doi: 10.1177/0956797616666074

Bibtex

@article{84a43227733644bd91bcb58ef5a435cd,
title = "The too-much-precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts",
abstract = "Past research has suggested a fundamental principle of price precision: The more precise an opening price, the more it anchors counteroffers. The present research challenges this principle by demonstrating a too-much-precision effect. Five experiments (involving 1,320 experts and amateurs in real-estate, jewelry, car, and human-resources negotiations) showed that increasing the precision of an opening offer had positive linear effects for amateurs but inverted-U-shaped effects for experts. Anchor precision backfired because experts saw too much precision as reflecting a lack of competence. This negative effect held unless first movers gave rationales that boosted experts{\textquoteright} perception of their competence. Statistical mediation and experimental moderation established the critical role of competence attributions. This research disentangles competing theoretical accounts (attribution of competence vs. scale granularity) and qualifies two putative truisms: that anchors affect experts and amateurs equally, and that more precise prices are linearly more potent anchors. The results refine current theoretical understanding of anchoring and have significant implications for everyday life.",
keywords = "Psychology, anchoring, experts versus amateurs, first offers , judgment , negotiation , open data , open materials , precision",
author = "Loschelder, {David D.} and Malte Friese and Michael Schaerer and Galinsky, {Adam D.}",
year = "2016",
month = dec,
doi = "10.1177/0956797616666074",
language = "English",
volume = "27",
pages = "1573--1587",
journal = "Psychological Science",
issn = "0956-7976",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Inc.",
number = "12",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The too-much-precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts

AU - Loschelder, David D.

AU - Friese, Malte

AU - Schaerer, Michael

AU - Galinsky, Adam D.

PY - 2016/12

Y1 - 2016/12

N2 - Past research has suggested a fundamental principle of price precision: The more precise an opening price, the more it anchors counteroffers. The present research challenges this principle by demonstrating a too-much-precision effect. Five experiments (involving 1,320 experts and amateurs in real-estate, jewelry, car, and human-resources negotiations) showed that increasing the precision of an opening offer had positive linear effects for amateurs but inverted-U-shaped effects for experts. Anchor precision backfired because experts saw too much precision as reflecting a lack of competence. This negative effect held unless first movers gave rationales that boosted experts’ perception of their competence. Statistical mediation and experimental moderation established the critical role of competence attributions. This research disentangles competing theoretical accounts (attribution of competence vs. scale granularity) and qualifies two putative truisms: that anchors affect experts and amateurs equally, and that more precise prices are linearly more potent anchors. The results refine current theoretical understanding of anchoring and have significant implications for everyday life.

AB - Past research has suggested a fundamental principle of price precision: The more precise an opening price, the more it anchors counteroffers. The present research challenges this principle by demonstrating a too-much-precision effect. Five experiments (involving 1,320 experts and amateurs in real-estate, jewelry, car, and human-resources negotiations) showed that increasing the precision of an opening offer had positive linear effects for amateurs but inverted-U-shaped effects for experts. Anchor precision backfired because experts saw too much precision as reflecting a lack of competence. This negative effect held unless first movers gave rationales that boosted experts’ perception of their competence. Statistical mediation and experimental moderation established the critical role of competence attributions. This research disentangles competing theoretical accounts (attribution of competence vs. scale granularity) and qualifies two putative truisms: that anchors affect experts and amateurs equally, and that more precise prices are linearly more potent anchors. The results refine current theoretical understanding of anchoring and have significant implications for everyday life.

KW - Psychology

KW - anchoring

KW - experts versus amateurs

KW - first offers

KW - judgment

KW - negotiation

KW - open data

KW - open materials

KW - precision

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85006110281&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/0956797616666074

DO - 10.1177/0956797616666074

M3 - Journal articles

C2 - 27789792

VL - 27

SP - 1573

EP - 1587

JO - Psychological Science

JF - Psychological Science

SN - 0956-7976

IS - 12

ER -

DOI