The too-much-precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts
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In: Psychological Science, Vol. 27, No. 12, 12.2016, p. 1573-1587.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The too-much-precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts
AU - Loschelder, David D.
AU - Friese, Malte
AU - Schaerer, Michael
AU - Galinsky, Adam D.
PY - 2016/12
Y1 - 2016/12
N2 - Past research has suggested a fundamental principle of price precision: The more precise an opening price, the more it anchors counteroffers. The present research challenges this principle by demonstrating a too-much-precision effect. Five experiments (involving 1,320 experts and amateurs in real-estate, jewelry, car, and human-resources negotiations) showed that increasing the precision of an opening offer had positive linear effects for amateurs but inverted-U-shaped effects for experts. Anchor precision backfired because experts saw too much precision as reflecting a lack of competence. This negative effect held unless first movers gave rationales that boosted experts’ perception of their competence. Statistical mediation and experimental moderation established the critical role of competence attributions. This research disentangles competing theoretical accounts (attribution of competence vs. scale granularity) and qualifies two putative truisms: that anchors affect experts and amateurs equally, and that more precise prices are linearly more potent anchors. The results refine current theoretical understanding of anchoring and have significant implications for everyday life.
AB - Past research has suggested a fundamental principle of price precision: The more precise an opening price, the more it anchors counteroffers. The present research challenges this principle by demonstrating a too-much-precision effect. Five experiments (involving 1,320 experts and amateurs in real-estate, jewelry, car, and human-resources negotiations) showed that increasing the precision of an opening offer had positive linear effects for amateurs but inverted-U-shaped effects for experts. Anchor precision backfired because experts saw too much precision as reflecting a lack of competence. This negative effect held unless first movers gave rationales that boosted experts’ perception of their competence. Statistical mediation and experimental moderation established the critical role of competence attributions. This research disentangles competing theoretical accounts (attribution of competence vs. scale granularity) and qualifies two putative truisms: that anchors affect experts and amateurs equally, and that more precise prices are linearly more potent anchors. The results refine current theoretical understanding of anchoring and have significant implications for everyday life.
KW - Psychology
KW - anchoring
KW - experts versus amateurs
KW - first offers
KW - judgment
KW - negotiation
KW - open data
KW - open materials
KW - precision
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85006110281&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/0956797616666074
DO - 10.1177/0956797616666074
M3 - Journal articles
C2 - 27789792
VL - 27
SP - 1573
EP - 1587
JO - Psychological Science
JF - Psychological Science
SN - 0956-7976
IS - 12
ER -