The termination of international sanctions: explaining target compliance and sender capitulation
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In: European Economic Review, Vol. 129, 103565, 10.2020.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The termination of international sanctions
T2 - explaining target compliance and sender capitulation
AU - Attia, Hana
AU - Grauvogel, Julia
AU - von Soest, Christian
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2020/10
Y1 - 2020/10
N2 - With the proliferation of sanctions after the end of the Cold War, the termination of these punitive measures has become a ubiquitous phenomenon in international politics. Yet, research has hitherto almost exclusively focused on sanctions’ implementation and effectiveness, whereas their termination has received little attention. In this paper, we draw on studies analyzing the varying duration of sanctions to examine under which conditions they end. In contrast to prior research that has mostly treated the end of sanctions as a single category, our analysis disaggregates sanctions termination by target compliance and sender capitulation. We run a competing risks model using novel dyadic sanctions data and show that the determinants of both outcomes significantly diverge. While poor economic health and high political volatility in the target country make it significantly more likely to comply, political alignment between the sender and target and leadership changes in the sender country lead to a higher probability of sender capitulation.
AB - With the proliferation of sanctions after the end of the Cold War, the termination of these punitive measures has become a ubiquitous phenomenon in international politics. Yet, research has hitherto almost exclusively focused on sanctions’ implementation and effectiveness, whereas their termination has received little attention. In this paper, we draw on studies analyzing the varying duration of sanctions to examine under which conditions they end. In contrast to prior research that has mostly treated the end of sanctions as a single category, our analysis disaggregates sanctions termination by target compliance and sender capitulation. We run a competing risks model using novel dyadic sanctions data and show that the determinants of both outcomes significantly diverge. While poor economic health and high political volatility in the target country make it significantly more likely to comply, political alignment between the sender and target and leadership changes in the sender country lead to a higher probability of sender capitulation.
KW - Sanctions
KW - Sanctions termination
KW - Sender capitulation
KW - Target compliance
KW - Politics
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089951412&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103565
DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103565
M3 - Journal articles
AN - SCOPUS:85089951412
VL - 129
JO - European Economic Review
JF - European Economic Review
SN - 0014-2921
M1 - 103565
ER -