Discovering Cooperation: Endogenous Change in International Organizations
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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in: Review of International Organizations, Jahrgang 18, Nr. 4, 10.2023, S. 631-666.
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - Discovering Cooperation
T2 - Endogenous Change in International Organizations
AU - Lenz, Tobias
AU - Ceka, Besir
AU - Hooghe, Liesbet
AU - Marks, Gary
AU - Burilkov, Alexandr
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022, The Author(s).
PY - 2023/10
Y1 - 2023/10
N2 - Why do some international organizations (IO) accrete delegated authority over time while in others delegation is static or declines? We hypothesize that the dynamics of delegation are shaped by an IO’s founding contract. IOs rooted in an open-ended contract have the capacity to discover cooperation over time: as new problems arise these IOs can adopt new policies or strengthen collaboration in existing areas. This, in turn, triggers a demand for delegation. However, this logic is mediated by the political regime of the IO. In predominantly democratic IOs, delegation is constrained by politicization which intensifies as an IO’s policy portfolio broadens. These claims are tested using an updated version of the Measure of International Authority dataset covering 41 regional IOs between 1950 and 2019. Controlling for alternative explanations and addressing potential endogeneity across a range of model specifications, we find robust support for our argument.
AB - Why do some international organizations (IO) accrete delegated authority over time while in others delegation is static or declines? We hypothesize that the dynamics of delegation are shaped by an IO’s founding contract. IOs rooted in an open-ended contract have the capacity to discover cooperation over time: as new problems arise these IOs can adopt new policies or strengthen collaboration in existing areas. This, in turn, triggers a demand for delegation. However, this logic is mediated by the political regime of the IO. In predominantly democratic IOs, delegation is constrained by politicization which intensifies as an IO’s policy portfolio broadens. These claims are tested using an updated version of the Measure of International Authority dataset covering 41 regional IOs between 1950 and 2019. Controlling for alternative explanations and addressing potential endogeneity across a range of model specifications, we find robust support for our argument.
KW - Politics
KW - International organization
KW - Regional organization
KW - Delegation
KW - Institutional design
KW - Politicization
KW - Endogenous change
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85143968170&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/faa28e93-07e8-34f3-867b-8da284feaf5a/
U2 - 10.1007/s11558-022-09482-0
DO - 10.1007/s11558-022-09482-0
M3 - Journal articles
C2 - 36530945
VL - 18
SP - 631
EP - 666
JO - Review of International Organizations
JF - Review of International Organizations
SN - 1559-7431
IS - 4
ER -