Discovering Cooperation: Endogenous Change in International Organizations
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In: Review of International Organizations, Vol. 18, No. 4, 10.2023, p. 631-666.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Discovering Cooperation
T2 - Endogenous Change in International Organizations
AU - Lenz, Tobias
AU - Ceka, Besir
AU - Hooghe, Liesbet
AU - Marks, Gary
AU - Burilkov, Alexandr
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022, The Author(s). Funding Information: Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the “Theory Meets Data” workshop at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; the 2013 International Studies Association meeting; the 2013 meeting of the Council of Europeanists; the VU-UVA Seminar; the RSCAS Seminar Series at the EUI; the Free University of Berlin; the University of Göttingen; Hertie School, Berlin; Munich University; New York University; Nuffield College, Oxford University; the Munk Centre, University of Toronto; the Barcelona Workshop on Global Governance; the VU University Amsterdam; the Steiner Seminar at UNC Chapel Hill; the ETH in Zurich; the 2021 German Political Science Association Convention; and the workshop “Collective Agency of International Institutions” at the University of Bamberg. The authors are grateful for comments from participants at these seminars, and wish to thank in particular Thomas Bernauer, Tanja Börzel, Biran Burgoon, Tim Büthe, Jeff Checkel, Carlos Closa, Thomas Christiansen, Mark Crescenzi, Ben Crum, Catherine de Vries, Hylke Dijkstra, Thomas Gehring, Philipp Genschel, Stephen Gent, Yoram Haftel, Eugenia Heldt, Adrienne Héritier, Markus Jachtenfuchs, Robert Keohane, Christiane Lemke, David Levi-Faur, Andrea Liese, Walter Mattli, Tim McKeown, Kimberly Morgan, Kalypso Nicolaidis, Diana Panke, Thomas Risse, Berthold Rittberger, Thomas Rixen, Charlie Roger, Frank Schimmelfennig, Thomas Sommerer, Jonas Tallberg, Bernhard Zangl, and Michael Zürn. We also thank the editor and three anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments. Thanks for assistance in data collection and coding go to Kyle Chan, Dan Eran, Mona Saleh, Kai Stern and Emily Venturi. The authors acknowledge funding from the Ministry of Science and Culture of Lower Saxony’s Research Cooperation Lower Saxony – Israel grant, the Kenan and Burton Craige Foundations at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the European Union’s Advanced European Research Council grant #885026 TRANSNATIONAL. Publisher Copyright: © 2022, The Author(s).
PY - 2023/10
Y1 - 2023/10
N2 - Why do some international organizations (IO) accrete delegated authority over time while in others delegation is static or declines? We hypothesize that the dynamics of delegation are shaped by an IO’s founding contract. IOs rooted in an open-ended contract have the capacity to discover cooperation over time: as new problems arise these IOs can adopt new policies or strengthen collaboration in existing areas. This, in turn, triggers a demand for delegation. However, this logic is mediated by the political regime of the IO. In predominantly democratic IOs, delegation is constrained by politicization which intensifies as an IO’s policy portfolio broadens. These claims are tested using an updated version of the Measure of International Authority dataset covering 41 regional IOs between 1950 and 2019. Controlling for alternative explanations and addressing potential endogeneity across a range of model specifications, we find robust support for our argument.
AB - Why do some international organizations (IO) accrete delegated authority over time while in others delegation is static or declines? We hypothesize that the dynamics of delegation are shaped by an IO’s founding contract. IOs rooted in an open-ended contract have the capacity to discover cooperation over time: as new problems arise these IOs can adopt new policies or strengthen collaboration in existing areas. This, in turn, triggers a demand for delegation. However, this logic is mediated by the political regime of the IO. In predominantly democratic IOs, delegation is constrained by politicization which intensifies as an IO’s policy portfolio broadens. These claims are tested using an updated version of the Measure of International Authority dataset covering 41 regional IOs between 1950 and 2019. Controlling for alternative explanations and addressing potential endogeneity across a range of model specifications, we find robust support for our argument.
KW - Politics
KW - International organization
KW - Regional organization
KW - Delegation
KW - Institutional design
KW - Politicization
KW - Endogenous change
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85143968170&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/faa28e93-07e8-34f3-867b-8da284feaf5a/
U2 - 10.1007/s11558-022-09482-0
DO - 10.1007/s11558-022-09482-0
M3 - Journal articles
C2 - 36530945
VL - 18
SP - 631
EP - 666
JO - Review of International Organizations
JF - Review of International Organizations
SN - 1559-7431
IS - 4
ER -