Anmerkungen zur naturrechtlichen Begründung geistigen Eigentums

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Anmerkungen zur naturrechtlichen Begründung geistigen Eigentums. / Schefczyk, Michael.
In: Juridikum : Zeitschrift für Kritik - Recht - Gesellschaft, No. 2, 2004, p. 60-64.

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@article{841b8d2c4e8542d38edfe58d697313d7,
title = "Anmerkungen zur naturrechtlichen Begr{\"u}ndung geistigen Eigentums",
abstract = "The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account.",
keywords = "Philosophie",
author = "Michael Schefczyk",
year = "2004",
language = "Deutsch",
pages = "60--64",
journal = "Juridikum : Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Kritik - Recht - Gesellschaft",
issn = "2309-7477",
publisher = "Verlag {\"O}sterreich GmbH",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Anmerkungen zur naturrechtlichen Begründung geistigen Eigentums

AU - Schefczyk, Michael

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account.

AB - The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account.

KW - Philosophie

M3 - Zeitschriftenaufsätze

SP - 60

EP - 64

JO - Juridikum : Zeitschrift für Kritik - Recht - Gesellschaft

JF - Juridikum : Zeitschrift für Kritik - Recht - Gesellschaft

SN - 2309-7477

IS - 2

ER -