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Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis

Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet

Standard

Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis. / Seng, Kilian; Biesenbender, Jan.
in: Journal of Contemporary European Research, Jahrgang 8, Nr. 4, 31.12.2012, S. 451-469.

Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet

Harvard

Seng, K & Biesenbender, J 2012, 'Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis', Journal of Contemporary European Research, Jg. 8, Nr. 4, S. 451-469. https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v8i4.416

APA

Seng, K., & Biesenbender, J. (2012). Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 8(4), 451-469. https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v8i4.416

Vancouver

Seng K, Biesenbender J. Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis. Journal of Contemporary European Research. 2012 Dez 31;8(4):451-469. doi: 10.30950/jcer.v8i4.416

Bibtex

@article{ba4b89406d384aaa8592604938724ca8,
title = "Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis",
abstract = "It is a commonplace that the mechanisms established in the stability and growth pact are blunt instruments. They are highly politicised as both the establishment of infringements and possible sanctions are subject to votes in the EU Council. The financial crisis of 2009/10 has dramatically altered the financial situation of many EU member states and has also shown the need for new regulatory instruments to enforce budgetary discipline in the Euro zone. Figures on the EU member states{\textquoteright} budget debts from 1999 to 2010 support this argument empirically. We discuss the current reform proposals and show that the introduction of a reversed qualified majority is likely to strengthen substantially the position of the European Commission to sanction non-complying member states. This becomes possible because decisive players in the EU Council will be closer to the position of the Commission.",
keywords = "Politics, Stability and Growth Pact, EU, Financial crisis",
author = "Kilian Seng and Jan Biesenbender",
year = "2012",
month = dec,
day = "31",
doi = "10.30950/jcer.v8i4.416",
language = "English",
volume = "8",
pages = "451--469",
journal = "Journal of Contemporary European Research",
issn = "1815-347X",
publisher = "UACES",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis

AU - Seng, Kilian

AU - Biesenbender, Jan

PY - 2012/12/31

Y1 - 2012/12/31

N2 - It is a commonplace that the mechanisms established in the stability and growth pact are blunt instruments. They are highly politicised as both the establishment of infringements and possible sanctions are subject to votes in the EU Council. The financial crisis of 2009/10 has dramatically altered the financial situation of many EU member states and has also shown the need for new regulatory instruments to enforce budgetary discipline in the Euro zone. Figures on the EU member states’ budget debts from 1999 to 2010 support this argument empirically. We discuss the current reform proposals and show that the introduction of a reversed qualified majority is likely to strengthen substantially the position of the European Commission to sanction non-complying member states. This becomes possible because decisive players in the EU Council will be closer to the position of the Commission.

AB - It is a commonplace that the mechanisms established in the stability and growth pact are blunt instruments. They are highly politicised as both the establishment of infringements and possible sanctions are subject to votes in the EU Council. The financial crisis of 2009/10 has dramatically altered the financial situation of many EU member states and has also shown the need for new regulatory instruments to enforce budgetary discipline in the Euro zone. Figures on the EU member states’ budget debts from 1999 to 2010 support this argument empirically. We discuss the current reform proposals and show that the introduction of a reversed qualified majority is likely to strengthen substantially the position of the European Commission to sanction non-complying member states. This becomes possible because decisive players in the EU Council will be closer to the position of the Commission.

KW - Politics

KW - Stability and Growth Pact

KW - EU

KW - Financial crisis

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84873035530&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.30950/jcer.v8i4.416

DO - 10.30950/jcer.v8i4.416

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 8

SP - 451

EP - 469

JO - Journal of Contemporary European Research

JF - Journal of Contemporary European Research

SN - 1815-347X

IS - 4

ER -

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