Increased auditor independence by external rotation and separating audit and non audit duties? A note on the European audit regulation

Research output: Journal contributionsJournal articlesResearchpeer-review

Standard

Increased auditor independence by external rotation and separating audit and non audit duties? A note on the European audit regulation. / Velte, Patrick; Eulerich, Marc.
In: Journal of Governance and Regulation, Vol. 3, No. 2, 01.01.2014, p. 53-62.

Research output: Journal contributionsJournal articlesResearchpeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Bibtex

@article{6cfebf9a5e1c4a23beee0ca75621f627,
title = "Increased auditor independence by external rotation and separating audit and non audit duties?: A note on the European audit regulation",
abstract = "The European audit reform contains the implementation of an external mandatory auditor rotation (audit firm rotation) and a separation of audit and non audit duties to increase auditor independence. The central question is, whether these regulation measures are connected with an increased accounting and audit quality. First, this article presents an agency theoretical foundation of auditor independence. Then, a state of the art analysis of empirical research illustrates these ambivalent results, so that the economic need for the audit market regulation in Europe is controversial.",
keywords = "Management studies, Low Balling, Audit Quality, Empirical Audit Research, Auditor Independence, RotaTion",
author = "Patrick Velte and Marc Eulerich",
year = "2014",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.22495/jgr_v3_i2_p5",
language = "English",
volume = "3",
pages = "53--62",
journal = "Journal of Governance and Regulation",
issn = "2306-6784",
publisher = "Virtus Interpress",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Increased auditor independence by external rotation and separating audit and non audit duties?

T2 - A note on the European audit regulation

AU - Velte, Patrick

AU - Eulerich, Marc

PY - 2014/1/1

Y1 - 2014/1/1

N2 - The European audit reform contains the implementation of an external mandatory auditor rotation (audit firm rotation) and a separation of audit and non audit duties to increase auditor independence. The central question is, whether these regulation measures are connected with an increased accounting and audit quality. First, this article presents an agency theoretical foundation of auditor independence. Then, a state of the art analysis of empirical research illustrates these ambivalent results, so that the economic need for the audit market regulation in Europe is controversial.

AB - The European audit reform contains the implementation of an external mandatory auditor rotation (audit firm rotation) and a separation of audit and non audit duties to increase auditor independence. The central question is, whether these regulation measures are connected with an increased accounting and audit quality. First, this article presents an agency theoretical foundation of auditor independence. Then, a state of the art analysis of empirical research illustrates these ambivalent results, so that the economic need for the audit market regulation in Europe is controversial.

KW - Management studies

KW - Low Balling

KW - Audit Quality

KW - Empirical Audit Research

KW - Auditor Independence

KW - RotaTion

UR - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2521021

U2 - 10.22495/jgr_v3_i2_p5

DO - 10.22495/jgr_v3_i2_p5

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 3

SP - 53

EP - 62

JO - Journal of Governance and Regulation

JF - Journal of Governance and Regulation

SN - 2306-6784

IS - 2

ER -

DOI