Increased auditor independence by external rotation and separating audit and non audit duties? A note on the European audit regulation
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
Authors
The European audit reform contains the implementation of an external mandatory auditor rotation (audit firm rotation) and a separation of audit and non audit duties to increase auditor independence. The central question is, whether these regulation measures are connected with an increased accounting and audit quality. First, this article presents an agency theoretical foundation of auditor independence. Then, a state of the art analysis of empirical research illustrates these ambivalent results, so that the economic need for the audit market regulation in Europe is controversial.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Journal of Governance and Regulation |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Pages (from-to) | 53-62 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 01.01.2014 |
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management
- Public Administration
- Business and International Management
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- Management studies - Low Balling, Audit Quality, Empirical Audit Research, Auditor Independence, RotaTion