Between joint project, institutional bargaining and symbolic politics: initiatives for federalism reform in Germany, Austria and Switzerland

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Between joint project, institutional bargaining and symbolic politics : initiatives for federalism reform in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. / Grotz, Florian; Poier, Klaus.

in: Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, Jahrgang 6, Nr. 2, Supplement, 01.11.2012, S. 77-101.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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@article{ec1dcb4289164a0f83fe8e59c76caba3,
title = "Between joint project, institutional bargaining and symbolic politics: initiatives for federalism reform in Germany, Austria and Switzerland",
abstract = "In recent years, Germany, Austria and Switzerland have almost simultaneously embarked on a fundamental change of their federal constitutions. These reform attempts have not only varied in their final outcomes; they have also displayed considerable differences from the very outset. This paper argues that an ideal type classification—federalism reform as a {\textquoteleft}joint project{\textquoteright}, {\textquoteleft}institutional bargaining{\textquoteright} or as {\textquoteleft}symbolic politics{\textquoteright}—proves helpful in capturing the main procedural and policy-related characteristics of these three reform initiatives in a systematic manner. Recognizable differences result from the specific interplay between contextual changes, interest constellations of political decision-makers, and institutional preconditions.",
keywords = "Politics",
author = "Florian Grotz and Klaus Poier",
year = "2012",
month = nov,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s12286-011-0112-3",
language = "English",
volume = "6",
pages = "77--101",
journal = "Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft",
issn = "1865-2646",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "2, Supplement",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Between joint project, institutional bargaining and symbolic politics

T2 - initiatives for federalism reform in Germany, Austria and Switzerland

AU - Grotz, Florian

AU - Poier, Klaus

PY - 2012/11/1

Y1 - 2012/11/1

N2 - In recent years, Germany, Austria and Switzerland have almost simultaneously embarked on a fundamental change of their federal constitutions. These reform attempts have not only varied in their final outcomes; they have also displayed considerable differences from the very outset. This paper argues that an ideal type classification—federalism reform as a ‘joint project’, ‘institutional bargaining’ or as ‘symbolic politics’—proves helpful in capturing the main procedural and policy-related characteristics of these three reform initiatives in a systematic manner. Recognizable differences result from the specific interplay between contextual changes, interest constellations of political decision-makers, and institutional preconditions.

AB - In recent years, Germany, Austria and Switzerland have almost simultaneously embarked on a fundamental change of their federal constitutions. These reform attempts have not only varied in their final outcomes; they have also displayed considerable differences from the very outset. This paper argues that an ideal type classification—federalism reform as a ‘joint project’, ‘institutional bargaining’ or as ‘symbolic politics’—proves helpful in capturing the main procedural and policy-related characteristics of these three reform initiatives in a systematic manner. Recognizable differences result from the specific interplay between contextual changes, interest constellations of political decision-makers, and institutional preconditions.

KW - Politics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84993674050&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s12286-011-0112-3

DO - 10.1007/s12286-011-0112-3

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 6

SP - 77

EP - 101

JO - Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft

JF - Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft

SN - 1865-2646

IS - 2, Supplement

ER -

DOI