The power politics of international tax co-operation: Luxembourg, Austria and the automatic exchange of information
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
Authors
Luxembourg and Austria resisted exchanging bank data on non-resident interest income with European Union (EU) partners for over a decade. In March 2014 they eventually gave in. Theories of tax competition analysts usually apply to intra-EU bargaining over taxation cannot explain their change of tack. Instead, I argue that American imposition of bilateral exchange of information on the two countries unlocked negotiations at EU level. Concessions made to the United States (US) by Luxembourg and Austria activated a most-favoured nation clause contained in an EU directive. Moreover, the US also forced third countries to exchange bank data, thus reducing the risk of capital flight from Luxembourg and Austria.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Journal of European Public Policy |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Pages (from-to) | 409-428 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| ISSN | 1350-1763 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 16.03.2015 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:
© 2014, © 2014 Taylor & Francis.
- Public Administration
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- EU politics, FATCA, international political economy, power politics, savings directive, tax competition
- Politics
