The power politics of international tax co-operation: Luxembourg, Austria and the automatic exchange of information
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
Authors
Luxembourg and Austria resisted exchanging bank data on non-resident interest income with European Union (EU) partners for over a decade. In March 2014 they eventually gave in. Theories of tax competition analysts usually apply to intra-EU bargaining over taxation cannot explain their change of tack. Instead, I argue that American imposition of bilateral exchange of information on the two countries unlocked negotiations at EU level. Concessions made to the United States (US) by Luxembourg and Austria activated a most-favoured nation clause contained in an EU directive. Moreover, the US also forced third countries to exchange bank data, thus reducing the risk of capital flight from Luxembourg and Austria.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Journal of European Public Policy |
Volume | 22 |
Issue number | 3 |
Pages (from-to) | 409-428 |
Number of pages | 20 |
ISSN | 1350-1763 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 16.03.2015 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:
© 2014, © 2014 Taylor & Francis.
- EU politics, FATCA, international political economy, power politics, savings directive, tax competition
- Politics