TY - JOUR

T1 - The Multiple Self Objection to the Prudential Lifespan Account

AU - Schefczyk, Michael

PY - 2009/1/1

Y1 - 2009/1/1

N2 - Multiple self approaches purport that to have equal concern about all stages of one’s life is not a requirement of rationality. This poses a challenge to the prudential lifespan account which Norman Daniels advocates in Just health: meeting health needs fairly. Daniels has criticised the multiple self approach in earlier works, most extensively in Am I my parents keeper? In Just health, he only takes up the issue except in one footnote, presumably because he is convinced that his preceding discussions settled the matter. This article argues that Daniels underestimates the force of the multiple self objection to prudential lifespan account.

AB - Multiple self approaches purport that to have equal concern about all stages of one’s life is not a requirement of rationality. This poses a challenge to the prudential lifespan account which Norman Daniels advocates in Just health: meeting health needs fairly. Daniels has criticised the multiple self approach in earlier works, most extensively in Am I my parents keeper? In Just health, he only takes up the issue except in one footnote, presumably because he is convinced that his preceding discussions settled the matter. This article argues that Daniels underestimates the force of the multiple self objection to prudential lifespan account.

KW - Philosophy

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=58149255258&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1136/jme.2008.024380

DO - 10.1136/jme.2008.024380

M3 - Journal articles

C2 - 19103940

VL - 35

SP - 32

EP - 35

JO - Journal of Medical Ethics

JF - Journal of Medical Ethics

SN - 1473-4257

IS - 1

ER -