Self-Compassion as a Facet of Neuroticism? A Reply to the Comments of Neff, Tóth-Király, and Colosimo (2018)

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Self-Compassion as a Facet of Neuroticism? A Reply to the Comments of Neff, Tóth-Király, and Colosimo (2018). / Geiger, Mattis; Pfattheicher, Stefan; Hartung, Johanna et al.
In: European Journal of Personality, Vol. 32, No. 4, 01.07.2018, p. 393-404.

Research output: Journal contributionsJournal articlesResearchpeer-review

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Geiger M, Pfattheicher S, Hartung J, Weiss S, Schindler S, Wilhelm O. Self-Compassion as a Facet of Neuroticism? A Reply to the Comments of Neff, Tóth-Király, and Colosimo (2018). European Journal of Personality. 2018 Jul 1;32(4):393-404. doi: 10.1002/per.2168

Bibtex

@article{bcc0d6d0aa2c4d938866874fa97d8e86,
title = "Self-Compassion as a Facet of Neuroticism? A Reply to the Comments of Neff, T{\'o}th-Kir{\'a}ly, and Colosimo (2018)",
abstract = "In this paper, we respond to comments by Neff et al. (2018) made about our finding that the negative dimensions of self-compassion were redundant with facets of neuroticism (rs ≥ 0.85; Pfattheicher et al., 2017) and not incrementally valid. We first provide epistemological guidance for establishing psychological constructs, namely, three hurdles that new constructs must pass: theoretically and empirically sound measurement, discriminant validity, and incremental validity—and then apply these guidelines to the self-compassion scale. We then outline that the critique of Neff et al. (2018) is contestable. We question their decisions concerning data-analytic methods that help them to circumvent instead of passing the outlined hurdles. In a reanalysis of the data provided by Neff et al. (2018), we point to several conceptual and psychometric problems and conclude that self-compassion does not overcome the outlined hurdles. Instead, we show that our initial critique of the self-compassion scale holds and that its dimensions are best considered facets of neuroticism.",
keywords = "jangle fallacy, neuroticism, rebuttal, self-compassion, Psychology",
author = "Mattis Geiger and Stefan Pfattheicher and Johanna Hartung and Selina Weiss and Simon Schindler and Oliver Wilhelm",
year = "2018",
month = jul,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1002/per.2168",
language = "English",
volume = "32",
pages = "393--404",
journal = "European Journal of Personality",
issn = "0890-2070",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Inc.",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Self-Compassion as a Facet of Neuroticism? A Reply to the Comments of Neff, Tóth-Király, and Colosimo (2018)

AU - Geiger, Mattis

AU - Pfattheicher, Stefan

AU - Hartung, Johanna

AU - Weiss, Selina

AU - Schindler, Simon

AU - Wilhelm, Oliver

PY - 2018/7/1

Y1 - 2018/7/1

N2 - In this paper, we respond to comments by Neff et al. (2018) made about our finding that the negative dimensions of self-compassion were redundant with facets of neuroticism (rs ≥ 0.85; Pfattheicher et al., 2017) and not incrementally valid. We first provide epistemological guidance for establishing psychological constructs, namely, three hurdles that new constructs must pass: theoretically and empirically sound measurement, discriminant validity, and incremental validity—and then apply these guidelines to the self-compassion scale. We then outline that the critique of Neff et al. (2018) is contestable. We question their decisions concerning data-analytic methods that help them to circumvent instead of passing the outlined hurdles. In a reanalysis of the data provided by Neff et al. (2018), we point to several conceptual and psychometric problems and conclude that self-compassion does not overcome the outlined hurdles. Instead, we show that our initial critique of the self-compassion scale holds and that its dimensions are best considered facets of neuroticism.

AB - In this paper, we respond to comments by Neff et al. (2018) made about our finding that the negative dimensions of self-compassion were redundant with facets of neuroticism (rs ≥ 0.85; Pfattheicher et al., 2017) and not incrementally valid. We first provide epistemological guidance for establishing psychological constructs, namely, three hurdles that new constructs must pass: theoretically and empirically sound measurement, discriminant validity, and incremental validity—and then apply these guidelines to the self-compassion scale. We then outline that the critique of Neff et al. (2018) is contestable. We question their decisions concerning data-analytic methods that help them to circumvent instead of passing the outlined hurdles. In a reanalysis of the data provided by Neff et al. (2018), we point to several conceptual and psychometric problems and conclude that self-compassion does not overcome the outlined hurdles. Instead, we show that our initial critique of the self-compassion scale holds and that its dimensions are best considered facets of neuroticism.

KW - jangle fallacy

KW - neuroticism

KW - rebuttal

KW - self-compassion

KW - Psychology

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85051752273&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1002/per.2168

DO - 10.1002/per.2168

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:85051752273

VL - 32

SP - 393

EP - 404

JO - European Journal of Personality

JF - European Journal of Personality

SN - 0890-2070

IS - 4

ER -

DOI