Self-Compassion as a Facet of Neuroticism? A Reply to the Comments of Neff, Tóth-Király, and Colosimo (2018)
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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in: European Journal of Personality, Jahrgang 32, Nr. 4, 01.07.2018, S. 393-404.
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Self-Compassion as a Facet of Neuroticism? A Reply to the Comments of Neff, Tóth-Király, and Colosimo (2018)
AU - Geiger, Mattis
AU - Pfattheicher, Stefan
AU - Hartung, Johanna
AU - Weiss, Selina
AU - Schindler, Simon
AU - Wilhelm, Oliver
PY - 2018/7/1
Y1 - 2018/7/1
N2 - In this paper, we respond to comments by Neff et al. (2018) made about our finding that the negative dimensions of self-compassion were redundant with facets of neuroticism (rs ≥ 0.85; Pfattheicher et al., 2017) and not incrementally valid. We first provide epistemological guidance for establishing psychological constructs, namely, three hurdles that new constructs must pass: theoretically and empirically sound measurement, discriminant validity, and incremental validity—and then apply these guidelines to the self-compassion scale. We then outline that the critique of Neff et al. (2018) is contestable. We question their decisions concerning data-analytic methods that help them to circumvent instead of passing the outlined hurdles. In a reanalysis of the data provided by Neff et al. (2018), we point to several conceptual and psychometric problems and conclude that self-compassion does not overcome the outlined hurdles. Instead, we show that our initial critique of the self-compassion scale holds and that its dimensions are best considered facets of neuroticism.
AB - In this paper, we respond to comments by Neff et al. (2018) made about our finding that the negative dimensions of self-compassion were redundant with facets of neuroticism (rs ≥ 0.85; Pfattheicher et al., 2017) and not incrementally valid. We first provide epistemological guidance for establishing psychological constructs, namely, three hurdles that new constructs must pass: theoretically and empirically sound measurement, discriminant validity, and incremental validity—and then apply these guidelines to the self-compassion scale. We then outline that the critique of Neff et al. (2018) is contestable. We question their decisions concerning data-analytic methods that help them to circumvent instead of passing the outlined hurdles. In a reanalysis of the data provided by Neff et al. (2018), we point to several conceptual and psychometric problems and conclude that self-compassion does not overcome the outlined hurdles. Instead, we show that our initial critique of the self-compassion scale holds and that its dimensions are best considered facets of neuroticism.
KW - jangle fallacy
KW - neuroticism
KW - rebuttal
KW - self-compassion
KW - Psychology
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85051752273&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1002/per.2168
DO - 10.1002/per.2168
M3 - Journal articles
AN - SCOPUS:85051752273
VL - 32
SP - 393
EP - 404
JO - European Journal of Personality
JF - European Journal of Personality
SN - 0890-2070
IS - 4
ER -