Executive Prerogatives in the Legislative Process and Democratic Stability: Evidence from Non-Presidential Systems
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In: Political Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, 01.02.2020, p. 71-86.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Executive Prerogatives in the Legislative Process and Democratic Stability
T2 - Evidence from Non-Presidential Systems
AU - Koß, Michael
PY - 2020/2/1
Y1 - 2020/2/1
N2 - In their seminal Presidents and Assemblies, Shugart and Carey regard executive prerogatives over legislation as a potential threat to democratic stability. This article asks whether this claim is also valid beyond presidential systems. A long-term analysis of four cases (Britain, France, Sweden and Germany) over the 1866–2015 period leads to three preliminarily conclusions. First, executive prerogatives – the veto, privileges in the introduction of certain pieces of legislation and decree powers – can also be found in (emerging) parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Second, even legislatures in non-presidential systems are able to balance the representativeness and efficiency of legislation. Third, there is evidence that the origins of this ability lie in the occurrence of and successful defences against vital threats to legislative democracy. Taken together, these findings suggest that executive prerogatives over legislation are not a problem (as envisaged by Shugart and Carey) but a potential solution with respect to democratic stability.
AB - In their seminal Presidents and Assemblies, Shugart and Carey regard executive prerogatives over legislation as a potential threat to democratic stability. This article asks whether this claim is also valid beyond presidential systems. A long-term analysis of four cases (Britain, France, Sweden and Germany) over the 1866–2015 period leads to three preliminarily conclusions. First, executive prerogatives – the veto, privileges in the introduction of certain pieces of legislation and decree powers – can also be found in (emerging) parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Second, even legislatures in non-presidential systems are able to balance the representativeness and efficiency of legislation. Third, there is evidence that the origins of this ability lie in the occurrence of and successful defences against vital threats to legislative democracy. Taken together, these findings suggest that executive prerogatives over legislation are not a problem (as envisaged by Shugart and Carey) but a potential solution with respect to democratic stability.
KW - Politics
KW - decree powers
KW - democratization
KW - legislative initiative
KW - legislative veto
KW - parliamentary systems
KW - semi-presidential systems
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85069453302&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/1478929919862235
DO - 10.1177/1478929919862235
M3 - Journal articles
AN - SCOPUS:85069453302
VL - 18
SP - 71
EP - 86
JO - Political Studies Review
JF - Political Studies Review
SN - 1478-9299
IS - 1
ER -