Executive Prerogatives in the Legislative Process and Democratic Stability: Evidence from Non-Presidential Systems

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Executive Prerogatives in the Legislative Process and Democratic Stability: Evidence from Non-Presidential Systems. / Koß, Michael.
in: Political Studies Review, Jahrgang 18, Nr. 1, 01.02.2020, S. 71-86.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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@article{bd0c9cecef9849c1b439f62d6adb6ec2,
title = "Executive Prerogatives in the Legislative Process and Democratic Stability: Evidence from Non-Presidential Systems",
abstract = "In their seminal Presidents and Assemblies, Shugart and Carey regard executive prerogatives over legislation as a potential threat to democratic stability. This article asks whether this claim is also valid beyond presidential systems. A long-term analysis of four cases (Britain, France, Sweden and Germany) over the 1866–2015 period leads to three preliminarily conclusions. First, executive prerogatives – the veto, privileges in the introduction of certain pieces of legislation and decree powers – can also be found in (emerging) parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Second, even legislatures in non-presidential systems are able to balance the representativeness and efficiency of legislation. Third, there is evidence that the origins of this ability lie in the occurrence of and successful defences against vital threats to legislative democracy. Taken together, these findings suggest that executive prerogatives over legislation are not a problem (as envisaged by Shugart and Carey) but a potential solution with respect to democratic stability.",
keywords = "Politics, decree powers, democratization, legislative initiative, legislative veto, parliamentary systems, semi-presidential systems",
author = "Michael Ko{\ss}",
year = "2020",
month = feb,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1177/1478929919862235",
language = "English",
volume = "18",
pages = "71--86",
journal = "Political Studies Review",
issn = "1478-9299",
publisher = "John Wiley & Sons Ltd.",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Executive Prerogatives in the Legislative Process and Democratic Stability

T2 - Evidence from Non-Presidential Systems

AU - Koß, Michael

PY - 2020/2/1

Y1 - 2020/2/1

N2 - In their seminal Presidents and Assemblies, Shugart and Carey regard executive prerogatives over legislation as a potential threat to democratic stability. This article asks whether this claim is also valid beyond presidential systems. A long-term analysis of four cases (Britain, France, Sweden and Germany) over the 1866–2015 period leads to three preliminarily conclusions. First, executive prerogatives – the veto, privileges in the introduction of certain pieces of legislation and decree powers – can also be found in (emerging) parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Second, even legislatures in non-presidential systems are able to balance the representativeness and efficiency of legislation. Third, there is evidence that the origins of this ability lie in the occurrence of and successful defences against vital threats to legislative democracy. Taken together, these findings suggest that executive prerogatives over legislation are not a problem (as envisaged by Shugart and Carey) but a potential solution with respect to democratic stability.

AB - In their seminal Presidents and Assemblies, Shugart and Carey regard executive prerogatives over legislation as a potential threat to democratic stability. This article asks whether this claim is also valid beyond presidential systems. A long-term analysis of four cases (Britain, France, Sweden and Germany) over the 1866–2015 period leads to three preliminarily conclusions. First, executive prerogatives – the veto, privileges in the introduction of certain pieces of legislation and decree powers – can also be found in (emerging) parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Second, even legislatures in non-presidential systems are able to balance the representativeness and efficiency of legislation. Third, there is evidence that the origins of this ability lie in the occurrence of and successful defences against vital threats to legislative democracy. Taken together, these findings suggest that executive prerogatives over legislation are not a problem (as envisaged by Shugart and Carey) but a potential solution with respect to democratic stability.

KW - Politics

KW - decree powers

KW - democratization

KW - legislative initiative

KW - legislative veto

KW - parliamentary systems

KW - semi-presidential systems

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85069453302&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/1478929919862235

DO - 10.1177/1478929919862235

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:85069453302

VL - 18

SP - 71

EP - 86

JO - Political Studies Review

JF - Political Studies Review

SN - 1478-9299

IS - 1

ER -

DOI