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Endogenous Environmental Policy when Pollution is Transboundary

Research output: Working paper › Working papers

Standard

Endogenous Environmental Policy when Pollution is Transboundary. / Fünfgelt, Joachim; Schulze, Günther G.
Lüneburg: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, 2011. (Working Paper Series in Economics; Vol. 195).

Research output: Working paper › Working papers

Harvard

Fünfgelt, J & Schulze, GG 2011 'Endogenous Environmental Policy when Pollution is Transboundary' Working Paper Series in Economics, vol. 195, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, Lüneburg.

APA

Fünfgelt, J., & Schulze, G. G. (2011). Endogenous Environmental Policy when Pollution is Transboundary. (Working Paper Series in Economics; Vol. 195). Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg.

Vancouver

Fünfgelt J, Schulze GG. Endogenous Environmental Policy when Pollution is Transboundary. Lüneburg: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg. 2011 Feb. (Working Paper Series in Economics).

Bibtex

@techreport{07a94960d0ed4d32a2dd0d5249953399,
title = "Endogenous Environmental Policy when Pollution is Transboundary",
abstract = "We analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulatetransboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agencyframework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political support-maximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction withrespect to their environmental policies, but too small to affect world marketprices. We show how governments systematically deviate from socially optimalenvironmental policies. Taxes may be too high if environmental interests andpollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different constellationsthey may be too low. Governments may actually subsidize the production of apolluting good. Politically motivated environmental policy thus may be moreharmful to the environment as compared to the benevolent dictators{\textquoteright} solution. Inother cases it may enhance environmental quality and welfare beyond what abenevolent government would achieve.",
keywords = "Sustainability sciences, Management & Economics, Altruism, externality, moral motivation, motivation crowding, Pareto efficiency, regulation, responsibility, taxes, provision of information, Economics, Altruism, externality, moral motivation, motivation crowding, Pareto efficiency, regulation, responsibility, taxes, provision of information",
author = "Joachim F{\"u}nfgelt and Schulze, {G{\"u}nther G.}",
year = "2011",
month = feb,
language = "English",
series = "Working Paper Series in Economics",
publisher = "Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universit{\"a}t L{\"u}neburg",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universit{\"a}t L{\"u}neburg",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Endogenous Environmental Policy when Pollution is Transboundary

AU - Fünfgelt, Joachim

AU - Schulze, Günther G.

PY - 2011/2

Y1 - 2011/2

N2 - We analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulatetransboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agencyframework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political support-maximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction withrespect to their environmental policies, but too small to affect world marketprices. We show how governments systematically deviate from socially optimalenvironmental policies. Taxes may be too high if environmental interests andpollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different constellationsthey may be too low. Governments may actually subsidize the production of apolluting good. Politically motivated environmental policy thus may be moreharmful to the environment as compared to the benevolent dictators’ solution. Inother cases it may enhance environmental quality and welfare beyond what abenevolent government would achieve.

AB - We analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulatetransboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agencyframework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political support-maximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction withrespect to their environmental policies, but too small to affect world marketprices. We show how governments systematically deviate from socially optimalenvironmental policies. Taxes may be too high if environmental interests andpollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different constellationsthey may be too low. Governments may actually subsidize the production of apolluting good. Politically motivated environmental policy thus may be moreharmful to the environment as compared to the benevolent dictators’ solution. Inother cases it may enhance environmental quality and welfare beyond what abenevolent government would achieve.

KW - Sustainability sciences, Management & Economics

KW - Altruism

KW - externality

KW - moral motivation

KW - motivation crowding

KW - Pareto efficiency

KW - regulation

KW - responsibility

KW - taxes

KW - provision of information

KW - Economics

KW - Altruism

KW - externality

KW - moral motivation

KW - motivation crowding

KW - Pareto efficiency

KW - regulation

KW - responsibility

KW - taxes

KW - provision of information

M3 - Working papers

T3 - Working Paper Series in Economics

BT - Endogenous Environmental Policy when Pollution is Transboundary

PB - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg

CY - Lüneburg

ER -

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