Das entgegengesetzte Denken. Metaphysische Marginalien zu Lévinas
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The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account.
| Translated title of the contribution | Perfectionism and Pathologies of Self-Realization |
|---|---|
| Original language | German |
| Journal | Agora42 |
| Issue number | 14 |
| Pages (from-to) | 23-27 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| ISSN | 1869-5434 |
| Publication status | Published - 1993 |
| Externally published | Yes |
- Philosophy