Belief in Free Will Relates to Attributions of Intentionality and Judgments of Responsibility
Research output: Contributions to collected editions/works › Chapter › peer-review
Authors
Oliver Genschow Marcel Brass Free will is a cornerstone of our society and relates to nearly everything we care about. The most prominent example in this respect may be our legal system in which punishment strongly depends on the degree to which a person acted “freely” (e. g. , Newman & Weitzer, 1956) . Thus, not surprisingly, across cultures (Sarkissian et al. , 2010) and ages (Nichols, 2004) , most people believe that they have free will (see also Baumeister et al. , 2009; Nahmias et al. , 2005) . At the same time, there is a long-standing philosophical debate about whether free will actually exists (e. g. , Dennett, 2015; Van Inwagen, 1983) . In the last few decades, prominent voices in cognitive neuroscience and psychology have entered this debate by claiming that free will is nothing more than an illusion (e. g. , Crick, 1994; Harris, 2012; Wegner,...
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility |
Editors | Thomas Nadelhoffer, Andrew Monroe |
Number of pages | 14 |
Place of Publication | London, |
Publisher | Bloomsbury Academic |
Publication date | 01.01.2022 |
Pages | 13-26 |
ISBN (print) | 978-1-3501-8808-2 |
ISBN (electronic) | 978-1-3501-8810-5, 978-1-3501-8809-9, 978-1-3501-8811-2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 01.01.2022 |
Externally published | Yes |
- Psychology