Two Readings of Bentham's Theory of Meaning as Applied to Moral and Political Discourse

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Two Readings of Bentham's Theory of Meaning as Applied to Moral and Political Discourse. / Palmer, Simon.
in: Ratio Juris, Jahrgang 34, Nr. 4, 01.12.2021, S. 386-414.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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@article{98837e45e7484702b1e80cae3b7f6903,
title = "Two Readings of Bentham's Theory of Meaning as Applied to Moral and Political Discourse",
abstract = "In this paper, I sketch out and assess two readings of Bentham's theory of meaning, one reductive (Section 2), the other quasi-pragmatist (Section 3)—both implicating Bentham's ontological and epistemological views. I focus on the way these readings would understand Bentham's analyses of claims in moral and political discourse that rely on putatively normative notions such as obligations and rights, good and bad, and what ought to be the case. I conclude the paper by suggesting tentatively that the independent merits of both readings could signal an irreconcilable tension at the heart of Bentham's thought (Section 4).",
keywords = "Psychology, Law",
author = "Simon Palmer",
year = "2021",
month = dec,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/raju.12333",
language = "English",
volume = "34",
pages = "386--414",
journal = "Ratio Juris",
issn = "0952-1917",
publisher = "Basil Blackwell",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Two Readings of Bentham's Theory of Meaning as Applied to Moral and Political Discourse

AU - Palmer, Simon

PY - 2021/12/1

Y1 - 2021/12/1

N2 - In this paper, I sketch out and assess two readings of Bentham's theory of meaning, one reductive (Section 2), the other quasi-pragmatist (Section 3)—both implicating Bentham's ontological and epistemological views. I focus on the way these readings would understand Bentham's analyses of claims in moral and political discourse that rely on putatively normative notions such as obligations and rights, good and bad, and what ought to be the case. I conclude the paper by suggesting tentatively that the independent merits of both readings could signal an irreconcilable tension at the heart of Bentham's thought (Section 4).

AB - In this paper, I sketch out and assess two readings of Bentham's theory of meaning, one reductive (Section 2), the other quasi-pragmatist (Section 3)—both implicating Bentham's ontological and epistemological views. I focus on the way these readings would understand Bentham's analyses of claims in moral and political discourse that rely on putatively normative notions such as obligations and rights, good and bad, and what ought to be the case. I conclude the paper by suggesting tentatively that the independent merits of both readings could signal an irreconcilable tension at the heart of Bentham's thought (Section 4).

KW - Psychology

KW - Law

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85124535463&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/ad09c8cf-e27c-314d-8584-5f2cc06a61d8/

U2 - 10.1111/raju.12333

DO - 10.1111/raju.12333

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:85124535463

VL - 34

SP - 386

EP - 414

JO - Ratio Juris

JF - Ratio Juris

SN - 0952-1917

IS - 4

ER -

DOI