Optimizing Counteroffers: How timing and magnitude shape sale prices and impasses in 26 million asynchronous online negotiations

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@article{8f2ff944e4f34186b202f320a613c361,
title = "Optimizing Counteroffers: How timing and magnitude shape sale prices and impasses in 26 million asynchronous online negotiations",
abstract = "Buyers often face a vexing decision regarding when and how ambitiously to counter a seller{\textquoteright}s first offer. Drawing on over 26 million real-world, asynchronous, electronically mediated negotiations (Study 1) and a controlled experiment (Study 2), we examined how the timing (early vs. late) and magnitude (ambitious vs. accommodating) of buyers{\textquoteright} counteroffers affect negotiation outcomes—specifically, final sale price and impasse risk. In Study 1, more ambitious counteroffers were associated with lower (i.e., more favorable) final prices for buyers, yet also increased the risk of impasse. Notably, we also uncovered a novel timing effect: late counteroffers led to more favorable final prices and reduced impasse risk. Study 2 (N = 213) provided causal evidence in a controlled experiment, demonstrating that both ambitious (vs. accommodating) and late (vs. early) counteroffers benefit buyers in asynchronous, electronically-mediated negotiations. Taken together, these findings underscore the importance of counteroffer timing and assertiveness in an increasingly common yet understudied context in negotiation research.",
keywords = "Anchoring, Conflict, Counteroffer, First offer, Impasse, Negotiations, Offer timing",
author = "Lars Teichmann and Petrowsky, {Hannes M.} and Escher, {Yannik A.} and Lee, {Alice J.} and Loschelder, {David D.}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} The Author(s) 2025.",
year = "2025",
doi = "10.1007/s10726-025-09932-1",
language = "English",
journal = "Group Decision and Negotiation",
issn = "0926-2644",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimizing Counteroffers

T2 - How timing and magnitude shape sale prices and impasses in 26 million asynchronous online negotiations

AU - Teichmann, Lars

AU - Petrowsky, Hannes M.

AU - Escher, Yannik A.

AU - Lee, Alice J.

AU - Loschelder, David D.

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s) 2025.

PY - 2025

Y1 - 2025

N2 - Buyers often face a vexing decision regarding when and how ambitiously to counter a seller’s first offer. Drawing on over 26 million real-world, asynchronous, electronically mediated negotiations (Study 1) and a controlled experiment (Study 2), we examined how the timing (early vs. late) and magnitude (ambitious vs. accommodating) of buyers’ counteroffers affect negotiation outcomes—specifically, final sale price and impasse risk. In Study 1, more ambitious counteroffers were associated with lower (i.e., more favorable) final prices for buyers, yet also increased the risk of impasse. Notably, we also uncovered a novel timing effect: late counteroffers led to more favorable final prices and reduced impasse risk. Study 2 (N = 213) provided causal evidence in a controlled experiment, demonstrating that both ambitious (vs. accommodating) and late (vs. early) counteroffers benefit buyers in asynchronous, electronically-mediated negotiations. Taken together, these findings underscore the importance of counteroffer timing and assertiveness in an increasingly common yet understudied context in negotiation research.

AB - Buyers often face a vexing decision regarding when and how ambitiously to counter a seller’s first offer. Drawing on over 26 million real-world, asynchronous, electronically mediated negotiations (Study 1) and a controlled experiment (Study 2), we examined how the timing (early vs. late) and magnitude (ambitious vs. accommodating) of buyers’ counteroffers affect negotiation outcomes—specifically, final sale price and impasse risk. In Study 1, more ambitious counteroffers were associated with lower (i.e., more favorable) final prices for buyers, yet also increased the risk of impasse. Notably, we also uncovered a novel timing effect: late counteroffers led to more favorable final prices and reduced impasse risk. Study 2 (N = 213) provided causal evidence in a controlled experiment, demonstrating that both ambitious (vs. accommodating) and late (vs. early) counteroffers benefit buyers in asynchronous, electronically-mediated negotiations. Taken together, these findings underscore the importance of counteroffer timing and assertiveness in an increasingly common yet understudied context in negotiation research.

KW - Anchoring

KW - Conflict

KW - Counteroffer

KW - First offer

KW - Impasse

KW - Negotiations

KW - Offer timing

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=105007238087&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10726-025-09932-1

DO - 10.1007/s10726-025-09932-1

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:105007238087

JO - Group Decision and Negotiation

JF - Group Decision and Negotiation

SN - 0926-2644

ER -

DOI