Earnings baths by bank CEOs during turnovers

Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und BerichteArbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

Standard

Earnings baths by bank CEOs during turnovers. / Bornemann, Sven; Pfingsten , Andreas; Kick, Thomas et al.
1. Aufl. Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bundesbank, 2014. (Bundesbank Discussion Paper; Band 2014, Nr. 5).

Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und BerichteArbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

Harvard

Bornemann, S, Pfingsten , A, Kick, T & Schertler, A 2014 'Earnings baths by bank CEOs during turnovers' Bundesbank Discussion Paper, Nr. 5, Bd. 2014, 1 Aufl., Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main. <https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/703820/4fc05361d62c7fb7a92770b2f48e6b8e/mL/2014-02-28-dkp-05-data.pdf>

APA

Bornemann, S., Pfingsten , A., Kick, T., & Schertler, A. (2014). Earnings baths by bank CEOs during turnovers. (1 Aufl.) (Bundesbank Discussion Paper; Band 2014, Nr. 5). Deutsche Bundesbank. https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/703820/4fc05361d62c7fb7a92770b2f48e6b8e/mL/2014-02-28-dkp-05-data.pdf

Vancouver

Bornemann S, Pfingsten A, Kick T, Schertler A. Earnings baths by bank CEOs during turnovers. 1 Aufl. Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bundesbank. 2014. (Bundesbank Discussion Paper; 5).

Bibtex

@techreport{d3379657ea4e432abc46d1e5dd459a25,
title = "Earnings baths by bank CEOs during turnovers",
abstract = "This study investigates the development of income-decreasing discretionary expenses surrounding CEO turnovers at banks. We expect incoming CEOs to take an earnings bath during the initial stage of their tenure. For a sample of German banks over the period 1993-2012, we document that (1) incoming CEOs increase discretionary expenses, i. e. engage in big bath accounting, during their first (partial) year in charge, (2) incoming CEOs from outside the bank take a larger earnings bath than insiders, and (3) incoming CEOs take a smaller earnings bath when the incumbent CEOs retire than when they leave for other reasons. Our findings are robust to several modifications. Most importantly, they also hold true when the incoming CEO{\textquoteright}s objective of rectifying shortages in the existing stock of risk provisions has been taken into account, which may provide an alternative explanation for observing extraordinary amounts of discretionary expenses in turnover years.",
keywords = "Management studies, CEO turnover, Earnings management, Big bath accounting, Discretionary expenses, Financial institutions, Psychology",
author = "Sven Bornemann and Andreas Pfingsten and Thomas Kick and Andrea Schertler",
year = "2014",
language = "English",
isbn = "978–3–95729–014–4",
series = "Bundesbank Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Deutsche Bundesbank",
number = "5",
edition = "1",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Deutsche Bundesbank",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Earnings baths by bank CEOs during turnovers

AU - Bornemann, Sven

AU - Pfingsten , Andreas

AU - Kick, Thomas

AU - Schertler, Andrea

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - This study investigates the development of income-decreasing discretionary expenses surrounding CEO turnovers at banks. We expect incoming CEOs to take an earnings bath during the initial stage of their tenure. For a sample of German banks over the period 1993-2012, we document that (1) incoming CEOs increase discretionary expenses, i. e. engage in big bath accounting, during their first (partial) year in charge, (2) incoming CEOs from outside the bank take a larger earnings bath than insiders, and (3) incoming CEOs take a smaller earnings bath when the incumbent CEOs retire than when they leave for other reasons. Our findings are robust to several modifications. Most importantly, they also hold true when the incoming CEO’s objective of rectifying shortages in the existing stock of risk provisions has been taken into account, which may provide an alternative explanation for observing extraordinary amounts of discretionary expenses in turnover years.

AB - This study investigates the development of income-decreasing discretionary expenses surrounding CEO turnovers at banks. We expect incoming CEOs to take an earnings bath during the initial stage of their tenure. For a sample of German banks over the period 1993-2012, we document that (1) incoming CEOs increase discretionary expenses, i. e. engage in big bath accounting, during their first (partial) year in charge, (2) incoming CEOs from outside the bank take a larger earnings bath than insiders, and (3) incoming CEOs take a smaller earnings bath when the incumbent CEOs retire than when they leave for other reasons. Our findings are robust to several modifications. Most importantly, they also hold true when the incoming CEO’s objective of rectifying shortages in the existing stock of risk provisions has been taken into account, which may provide an alternative explanation for observing extraordinary amounts of discretionary expenses in turnover years.

KW - Management studies

KW - CEO turnover

KW - Earnings management

KW - Big bath accounting

KW - Discretionary expenses

KW - Financial institutions

KW - Psychology

M3 - Working papers

SN - 978–3–95729–014–4

T3 - Bundesbank Discussion Paper

BT - Earnings baths by bank CEOs during turnovers

PB - Deutsche Bundesbank

CY - Frankfurt am Main

ER -