The present paper starts by arguing that a systematically important distinction between two forms of reflexiveness is tenable. The first emphasizes acts involving a human subject whereas the second transcends this category and is better pronounced as an ontological - possibly ecological - relation. The distinction itself is framed as a proactive problem invigorating a certain strand in the history of philosophy dealing with biological questions since Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Sketching out the genealogy then allows for contextualizing the method of categorical exposition insofar as it is deployed for conceptualizing living beings inHartmann and Plessner. In so doing the categorical difference of upward and downward causation is introduced while seizing upon Hegel’s ontology of logical grounding. Finally, the mathematically inspired concept of a reflexive closure operator summarizes the whole argument while relating both Hartmann’s and Plessner’s thought to current trends in the philosophy of science and also to some empirical contexts indicated in recent complex systems related research.