Being Tough or Being Nice? A Meta-Analysis on the Impact of Hard- and Softline Strategies in Distributive Negotiations

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Being Tough or Being Nice? A Meta-Analysis on the Impact of Hard- and Softline Strategies in Distributive Negotiations. / Hüffmeier, Joachim; Freund, Philipp Alexander; Zerres, Alfred et al.
in: Journal of Management, Jahrgang 40, Nr. 3, 03.2014, S. 866-892.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Hüffmeier J, Freund PA, Zerres A, Backhaus K, Hertel G. Being Tough or Being Nice? A Meta-Analysis on the Impact of Hard- and Softline Strategies in Distributive Negotiations. Journal of Management. 2014 Mär;40(3):866-892. doi: 10.1177/0149206311423788

Bibtex

@article{9178c8abe5a1427db806f4050da82d22,
title = "Being Tough or Being Nice? A Meta-Analysis on the Impact of Hard- and Softline Strategies in Distributive Negotiations",
abstract = "A meta-analysis (34 studies) is reported on the impact of hard- and softline bargaining strategies on economic (135 effect sizes) and socioemotional negotiation outcomes (30 effect sizes) in distributive negotiations. As expected, hardline strategies lead to higher economic outcomes, whereas softline strategies lead to higher socioemotional outcomes. Moreover, moderator variables are derived from the graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction model and the level of aspiration theory that are expected to qualify the relation of bargaining strategies and achieved economic outcomes. In accordance with this theoretical background, moderator analyses reveal that hardline negotiators gain the highest economic outcomes when visual contact is possible, when the opposing party is male, when negotiators are instructed to maximize individual outcomes, and when they know the bargaining zone. Also in line with the theoretical assumptions, softline negotiators gain the highest economic outcomes when they accurately reciprocate the opposing party's concessionary behavior. Contrary to the predictions, softline bargaining does, however, not prevail when the risk and cost of impasses are high. Based on the reported findings, needs for future research and theory building are identified and discussed.",
keywords = "Psychology, distributive negotiation, economic outcomes, hardline bargaining, meta-analysis, socioemotional outcomes, softline bargaining",
author = "Joachim H{\"u}ffmeier and Freund, {Philipp Alexander} and Alfred Zerres and Klaus Backhaus and Guido Hertel",
year = "2014",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1177/0149206311423788",
language = "English",
volume = "40",
pages = "866--892",
journal = "Journal of Management",
issn = "0149-2063",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Inc.",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Being Tough or Being Nice? A Meta-Analysis on the Impact of Hard- and Softline Strategies in Distributive Negotiations

AU - Hüffmeier, Joachim

AU - Freund, Philipp Alexander

AU - Zerres, Alfred

AU - Backhaus, Klaus

AU - Hertel, Guido

PY - 2014/3

Y1 - 2014/3

N2 - A meta-analysis (34 studies) is reported on the impact of hard- and softline bargaining strategies on economic (135 effect sizes) and socioemotional negotiation outcomes (30 effect sizes) in distributive negotiations. As expected, hardline strategies lead to higher economic outcomes, whereas softline strategies lead to higher socioemotional outcomes. Moreover, moderator variables are derived from the graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction model and the level of aspiration theory that are expected to qualify the relation of bargaining strategies and achieved economic outcomes. In accordance with this theoretical background, moderator analyses reveal that hardline negotiators gain the highest economic outcomes when visual contact is possible, when the opposing party is male, when negotiators are instructed to maximize individual outcomes, and when they know the bargaining zone. Also in line with the theoretical assumptions, softline negotiators gain the highest economic outcomes when they accurately reciprocate the opposing party's concessionary behavior. Contrary to the predictions, softline bargaining does, however, not prevail when the risk and cost of impasses are high. Based on the reported findings, needs for future research and theory building are identified and discussed.

AB - A meta-analysis (34 studies) is reported on the impact of hard- and softline bargaining strategies on economic (135 effect sizes) and socioemotional negotiation outcomes (30 effect sizes) in distributive negotiations. As expected, hardline strategies lead to higher economic outcomes, whereas softline strategies lead to higher socioemotional outcomes. Moreover, moderator variables are derived from the graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction model and the level of aspiration theory that are expected to qualify the relation of bargaining strategies and achieved economic outcomes. In accordance with this theoretical background, moderator analyses reveal that hardline negotiators gain the highest economic outcomes when visual contact is possible, when the opposing party is male, when negotiators are instructed to maximize individual outcomes, and when they know the bargaining zone. Also in line with the theoretical assumptions, softline negotiators gain the highest economic outcomes when they accurately reciprocate the opposing party's concessionary behavior. Contrary to the predictions, softline bargaining does, however, not prevail when the risk and cost of impasses are high. Based on the reported findings, needs for future research and theory building are identified and discussed.

KW - Psychology

KW - distributive negotiation

KW - economic outcomes

KW - hardline bargaining

KW - meta-analysis

KW - socioemotional outcomes

KW - softline bargaining

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84894849142&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/0149206311423788

DO - 10.1177/0149206311423788

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 40

SP - 866

EP - 892

JO - Journal of Management

JF - Journal of Management

SN - 0149-2063

IS - 3

ER -

DOI