Organized labor, labor market imperfections, and employer wage premia
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
Authors
Original language | English |
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Journal | Industrial and Labor Relations Review |
Volume | 77 |
Issue number | 3 |
Pages (from-to) | 396-427 |
Number of pages | 32 |
ISSN | 0019-7939 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 05.2024 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:
We thank Laszlo Goerke, Fabian Lange, and Todd Sorensen for very useful suggestions. We further appreciate comments by participants of the EALE/SOLE/AASLE 2020, the EEA 2020, the Verein für Socialpolitik 2020, the RES 2021, and the IAAE 2022 conferences, of the 21st IZA/SOLE 2022 Transatlantic meeting and the IAB 2023 workshop on “Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market,” and of presentations in Amsterdam, Basel, Halle, and Lüneburg. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under the grant title “Firm Wage Differentials in Imperfect Labour Markets: The Role of Market Power and Industrial Relations in Rent Splitting between Workers and Firms.”
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2024.
- Economics - collective wage agreements, employer monopsony, employer wage premia, labor market power, wage markdowns, wage markups, worker monopoly, works councils