Optimizing counteroffers: How timing and magnitude shape sale prices and impasses in 26 million asynchronous online negotiations
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In: Group Decision and Negotiation, 04.06.2025.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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T1 - Optimizing counteroffers: How timing and magnitude shape sale prices and impasses in 26 million asynchronous online negotiations
AU - Teichmann, Lars
AU - Petrowsky, Hannes M.
AU - Escher, Yannik Andrea
AU - Lee, Alice J.
AU - Loschelder, David D.
PY - 2025/6/4
Y1 - 2025/6/4
N2 - Buyers often face a vexing decision regarding when and how ambitiously to counter a seller’s first offer. Drawing on over 26 million real-world, asynchronous, electronically mediated negotiations (Study 1) and a controlled experiment (Study 2), we examined how the timing (early vs. late) and magnitude (ambitious vs. accommodating) of buyers’ counteroffers affect negotiation outcomes—specifically, final sale price and impasse risk. In Study 1, more ambitious counteroffers were associated with lower (i.e., more favorable) final prices for buyers, yet also increased the risk of impasse. Notably, we also uncovered a novel timing effect: late counteroffers led to more favorable final prices and reduced impasse risk. Study 2 (N = 213) provided causal evidence in a controlled experiment, demonstrating that both ambitious (vs. accommodating) and late (vs. early) counteroffers benefit buyers in asynchronous, electronically-mediated negotiations. Taken together, these findings underscore the importance of counteroffer timing and assertiveness in an increasingly common yet understudied context in negotiation research.
AB - Buyers often face a vexing decision regarding when and how ambitiously to counter a seller’s first offer. Drawing on over 26 million real-world, asynchronous, electronically mediated negotiations (Study 1) and a controlled experiment (Study 2), we examined how the timing (early vs. late) and magnitude (ambitious vs. accommodating) of buyers’ counteroffers affect negotiation outcomes—specifically, final sale price and impasse risk. In Study 1, more ambitious counteroffers were associated with lower (i.e., more favorable) final prices for buyers, yet also increased the risk of impasse. Notably, we also uncovered a novel timing effect: late counteroffers led to more favorable final prices and reduced impasse risk. Study 2 (N = 213) provided causal evidence in a controlled experiment, demonstrating that both ambitious (vs. accommodating) and late (vs. early) counteroffers benefit buyers in asynchronous, electronically-mediated negotiations. Taken together, these findings underscore the importance of counteroffer timing and assertiveness in an increasingly common yet understudied context in negotiation research.
KW - Psychology
KW - Negotiations
KW - Anchoring
KW - First offer
KW - Counteroffer
KW - impasse
KW - conflict
KW - offer timing
KW - Business psychology
U2 - 10.1007/s10726-025-09932-1
DO - 10.1007/s10726-025-09932-1
M3 - Journal articles
JO - Group Decision and Negotiation
JF - Group Decision and Negotiation
SN - 0926-2644
ER -