Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company

Research output: Working paperWorking papers

Standard

Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company. / Pfeifer, Christian.
Lüneburg: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, 2012. (Working paper series in economics; No. 259).

Research output: Working paperWorking papers

Harvard

Pfeifer, C 2012 'Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company' Working paper series in economics, no. 259, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, Lüneburg.

APA

Pfeifer, C. (2012). Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company. (Working paper series in economics; No. 259). Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg.

Vancouver

Pfeifer C. Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company. Lüneburg: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg. 2012. (Working paper series in economics; 259).

Bibtex

@techreport{d9e8675773f84eb9bae7401885716d17,
title = "Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company",
abstract = "Questions about compensation structures and incentive effects of pay-for-performance components are important for firms' Human Resource Management as well as for economics in general and labor economics in particular. This paper provides scarce insider econometric evidence on the structure and the incentive effects of fixed base salaries, paid bonuses, and agreed bonuses under a Management-by-Objectives (MBO) incentive scheme. Six years of personnel data of 177 managers in a German company are analyzed. The main findings are: (1) base salaries increase significantly with age, whereas bonuses decrease with age; (2) larger agreed bonuses are correlated with fewer absent working days.",
keywords = "Economics, absenteeism, bonus, effort, incentives, insider econometrics, wages",
author = "Christian Pfeifer",
year = "2012",
language = "English",
series = "Working paper series in economics",
publisher = "Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universit{\"a}t L{\"u}neburg",
number = "259",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universit{\"a}t L{\"u}neburg",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company

AU - Pfeifer, Christian

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Questions about compensation structures and incentive effects of pay-for-performance components are important for firms' Human Resource Management as well as for economics in general and labor economics in particular. This paper provides scarce insider econometric evidence on the structure and the incentive effects of fixed base salaries, paid bonuses, and agreed bonuses under a Management-by-Objectives (MBO) incentive scheme. Six years of personnel data of 177 managers in a German company are analyzed. The main findings are: (1) base salaries increase significantly with age, whereas bonuses decrease with age; (2) larger agreed bonuses are correlated with fewer absent working days.

AB - Questions about compensation structures and incentive effects of pay-for-performance components are important for firms' Human Resource Management as well as for economics in general and labor economics in particular. This paper provides scarce insider econometric evidence on the structure and the incentive effects of fixed base salaries, paid bonuses, and agreed bonuses under a Management-by-Objectives (MBO) incentive scheme. Six years of personnel data of 177 managers in a German company are analyzed. The main findings are: (1) base salaries increase significantly with age, whereas bonuses decrease with age; (2) larger agreed bonuses are correlated with fewer absent working days.

KW - Economics

KW - absenteeism

KW - bonus

KW - effort

KW - incentives

KW - insider econometrics

KW - wages

M3 - Working papers

T3 - Working paper series in economics

BT - Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company

PB - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg

CY - Lüneburg

ER -

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