The Power to Resist: Mobilization and the Logic of Terrorist Attacks in Civil War

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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The Power to Resist : Mobilization and the Logic of Terrorist Attacks in Civil War. / Polo, Sara M.T.; González, Belén.

in: Comparative Political Studies, Jahrgang 53, Nr. 13, 01.11.2020, S. 2029-2060.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Polo SMT, González B. The Power to Resist: Mobilization and the Logic of Terrorist Attacks in Civil War. Comparative Political Studies. 2020 Nov 1;53(13):2029-2060. Epub 2020 Apr 8. doi: 10.1177/0010414020912264

Bibtex

@article{e1e15fdf8965457fbde6607275dbe31c,
title = "The Power to Resist: Mobilization and the Logic of Terrorist Attacks in Civil War",
abstract = "Existing research has argued that terrorism is common in civil war because it is “effective.” Surprisingly, however, only some groups use terrorism during civil wars, while many refrain altogether. We also see considerable variation in the use of terrorism over time. This article presents a theory of terrorism as a mobilization strategy in civil war, taking into account benefits, costs, and temporal dynamics. We argue that the choice and the timing of terrorism arise from the interaction between conditions for effective mobilization and battlefield dynamics. Terrorism can mobilize support when it provokes indiscriminate government repression or when it radicalizes rebels{\textquoteright} constituency by antagonizing specific societal groups. The timing of attacks, however, is influenced by battlefield losses, which increase rebels{\textquoteright} need to rally civilian support. The analyses of new disaggregated data on rebels{\textquoteright} terrorist attacks during conflicts (1989–2009) and of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) tactics in Iraq and Syria support our theoretical argument.",
keywords = "civil war, conflict dynamics, mobilization, rebel groups, terrorism, Politics",
author = "Polo, {Sara M.T.} and Bel{\'e}n Gonz{\'a}lez",
year = "2020",
month = nov,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1177/0010414020912264",
language = "English",
volume = "53",
pages = "2029--2060",
journal = "Comparative Political Studies",
issn = "0010-4140",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Inc.",
number = "13",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Power to Resist

T2 - Mobilization and the Logic of Terrorist Attacks in Civil War

AU - Polo, Sara M.T.

AU - González, Belén

PY - 2020/11/1

Y1 - 2020/11/1

N2 - Existing research has argued that terrorism is common in civil war because it is “effective.” Surprisingly, however, only some groups use terrorism during civil wars, while many refrain altogether. We also see considerable variation in the use of terrorism over time. This article presents a theory of terrorism as a mobilization strategy in civil war, taking into account benefits, costs, and temporal dynamics. We argue that the choice and the timing of terrorism arise from the interaction between conditions for effective mobilization and battlefield dynamics. Terrorism can mobilize support when it provokes indiscriminate government repression or when it radicalizes rebels’ constituency by antagonizing specific societal groups. The timing of attacks, however, is influenced by battlefield losses, which increase rebels’ need to rally civilian support. The analyses of new disaggregated data on rebels’ terrorist attacks during conflicts (1989–2009) and of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) tactics in Iraq and Syria support our theoretical argument.

AB - Existing research has argued that terrorism is common in civil war because it is “effective.” Surprisingly, however, only some groups use terrorism during civil wars, while many refrain altogether. We also see considerable variation in the use of terrorism over time. This article presents a theory of terrorism as a mobilization strategy in civil war, taking into account benefits, costs, and temporal dynamics. We argue that the choice and the timing of terrorism arise from the interaction between conditions for effective mobilization and battlefield dynamics. Terrorism can mobilize support when it provokes indiscriminate government repression or when it radicalizes rebels’ constituency by antagonizing specific societal groups. The timing of attacks, however, is influenced by battlefield losses, which increase rebels’ need to rally civilian support. The analyses of new disaggregated data on rebels’ terrorist attacks during conflicts (1989–2009) and of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) tactics in Iraq and Syria support our theoretical argument.

KW - civil war

KW - conflict dynamics

KW - mobilization

KW - rebel groups

KW - terrorism

KW - Politics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85083088171&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/0010414020912264

DO - 10.1177/0010414020912264

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:85083088171

VL - 53

SP - 2029

EP - 2060

JO - Comparative Political Studies

JF - Comparative Political Studies

SN - 0010-4140

IS - 13

ER -

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