TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategic Self-Regulation in Groups

T2 - Collective Implementation Intentions Help Cooperate When Cooperation Is Called for

AU - Thürmer, J. Lukas

AU - Wieber, Frank

AU - Gollwitzer, Peter M.

N1 - This research was supported by the University of Konstanz YSF and AFF funding schemes.

PY - 2020/11/24

Y1 - 2020/11/24

N2 - Groups need contributions that are personally costly to their members. Such cooperation is only adaptive when others cooperate as well, as unconditional cooperation may incur high costs to the individual. We argue that individuals can use We-if-then plans (collective implementation intentions, cIIs) to regulate their group-directed behavior strategically, helping them to cooperate selectively with group members in the situation planned for. In line with this prediction, a cII to consider group earnings increased cooperative decisions in a prisoners’ dilemma game when playing against another group member but not when playing against a stranger (i.e., non-group member). Moreover, cIIs to cooperate in the prisoners’ dilemma game did not increase cooperation in a structurally similar investment game that participants had not planned for. We discuss the role of collective planning in solving social dilemmas.

AB - Groups need contributions that are personally costly to their members. Such cooperation is only adaptive when others cooperate as well, as unconditional cooperation may incur high costs to the individual. We argue that individuals can use We-if-then plans (collective implementation intentions, cIIs) to regulate their group-directed behavior strategically, helping them to cooperate selectively with group members in the situation planned for. In line with this prediction, a cII to consider group earnings increased cooperative decisions in a prisoners’ dilemma game when playing against another group member but not when playing against a stranger (i.e., non-group member). Moreover, cIIs to cooperate in the prisoners’ dilemma game did not increase cooperation in a structurally similar investment game that participants had not planned for. We discuss the role of collective planning in solving social dilemmas.

KW - collective implementation intentions

KW - cooperation

KW - motivation science

KW - prisoners’ dilemma

KW - self-regulation

KW - small group performance

KW - Psychology

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85096867747&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.561388

DO - 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.561388

M3 - Journal articles

C2 - 33329189

AN - SCOPUS:85096867747

VL - 11

JO - Frontiers in Psychology

JF - Frontiers in Psychology

SN - 1664-1078

M1 - 561388

ER -