Rechte an Immaterialgütern - Eine kantische Perspektive

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Rechte an Immaterialgütern - Eine kantische Perspektive. / Schefczyk, Michael.
in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Jahrgang 52, Nr. 5, 01.10.2004, S. 739-753.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenÜbersichtsarbeitenForschung

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@article{c913b97533854a0f96316deaf586a79b,
title = "Rechte an Immaterialg{\"u}tern - Eine kantische Perspektive",
abstract = "The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account.",
keywords = "Philosophie",
author = "Michael Schefczyk",
year = "2004",
month = oct,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1524/dzph.2004.52.5.739",
language = "Deutsch",
volume = "52",
pages = "739--753",
journal = "Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie",
issn = "0012-1045",
publisher = "Walter de Gruyter GmbH",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Rechte an Immaterialgütern - Eine kantische Perspektive

AU - Schefczyk, Michael

PY - 2004/10/1

Y1 - 2004/10/1

N2 - The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account.

AB - The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account.

KW - Philosophie

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=61049240252&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/cfc6e6c4-dd06-38d1-8fc8-6e065238f626/

U2 - 10.1524/dzph.2004.52.5.739

DO - 10.1524/dzph.2004.52.5.739

M3 - Übersichtsarbeiten

VL - 52

SP - 739

EP - 753

JO - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie

JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie

SN - 0012-1045

IS - 5

ER -

DOI