TY - JOUR

T1 - Rechte an Immaterialgütern - Eine kantische Perspektive

AU - Schefczyk, Michael

PY - 2004/10/1

Y1 - 2004/10/1

N2 - The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account.

AB - The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account.

KW - Philosophie

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=61049240252&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/cfc6e6c4-dd06-38d1-8fc8-6e065238f626/

U2 - 10.1524/dzph.2004.52.5.739

DO - 10.1524/dzph.2004.52.5.739

M3 - Übersichtsarbeiten

VL - 52

SP - 739

EP - 753

JO - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie

JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie

SN - 0012-1045

IS - 5

ER -