Der Deutsche Taximarkt: Das letzte (Kollektiv-)Monopol im Sturm der "neuen Zeit"

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

Standard

Der Deutsche Taximarkt: Das letzte (Kollektiv-)Monopol im Sturm der "neuen Zeit". / Pape, Annika; Wein, Thomas.
in: Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, Jahrgang 64, Nr. 3, 2015, S. 362-389.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Bibtex

@article{5100bb05c998476c98b88e4f8efe47bd,
title = "Der Deutsche Taximarkt: Das letzte (Kollektiv-)Monopol im Sturm der {"}neuen Zeit{"}",
abstract = "Smartphone-Apps and web-based tools improve the transparency of taxi rides with regard to prices and routing. These technical innovations reduce asymmetric information. Hence, obligatory knowledge tests of streets and important places are no longer necessary. However, the provision of taxis may yield a waiting externality. Empirically the regulator takes the costs, structures into account and, therefore, acts for the purpose of public interests. Nonetheless, the population variable seems questionable. The reasons for the puzzling results might refer to different perceptions with regard to waiting time in sparsely populated areas.",
keywords = "Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftspoliktik",
author = "Annika Pape and Thomas Wein",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1515/zfwp-2015-0308",
language = "Deutsch",
volume = "64",
pages = "362--389",
journal = "Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Wirtschaftspolitik",
issn = "0721-3808",
publisher = "Walter de Gruyter GmbH",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Der Deutsche Taximarkt

T2 - Das letzte (Kollektiv-)Monopol im Sturm der "neuen Zeit"

AU - Pape, Annika

AU - Wein, Thomas

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Smartphone-Apps and web-based tools improve the transparency of taxi rides with regard to prices and routing. These technical innovations reduce asymmetric information. Hence, obligatory knowledge tests of streets and important places are no longer necessary. However, the provision of taxis may yield a waiting externality. Empirically the regulator takes the costs, structures into account and, therefore, acts for the purpose of public interests. Nonetheless, the population variable seems questionable. The reasons for the puzzling results might refer to different perceptions with regard to waiting time in sparsely populated areas.

AB - Smartphone-Apps and web-based tools improve the transparency of taxi rides with regard to prices and routing. These technical innovations reduce asymmetric information. Hence, obligatory knowledge tests of streets and important places are no longer necessary. However, the provision of taxis may yield a waiting externality. Empirically the regulator takes the costs, structures into account and, therefore, acts for the purpose of public interests. Nonetheless, the population variable seems questionable. The reasons for the puzzling results might refer to different perceptions with regard to waiting time in sparsely populated areas.

KW - Volkswirtschaftslehre

KW - Wirtschaftspoliktik

UR - http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/zfwp.2015.64.issue-3/zfwp-2015-0308/zfwp-2015-0308.xml

U2 - 10.1515/zfwp-2015-0308

DO - 10.1515/zfwp-2015-0308

M3 - Zeitschriftenaufsätze

VL - 64

SP - 362

EP - 389

JO - Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik

JF - Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik

SN - 0721-3808

IS - 3

ER -

DOI