Automatic or controlled: How does disbelief in free will influence cognitive functioning?
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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in: British Journal of Psychology, Jahrgang 113, Nr. 4, 01.11.2022, S. 1121-1142.
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Automatic or controlled: How does disbelief in free will influence cognitive functioning?
AU - Katzir, Maayan
AU - Genschow, Oliver
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022 The Authors. British Journal of Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The British Psychological Society.
PY - 2022/11/1
Y1 - 2022/11/1
N2 - Most people believe in free will. Past research has indicated that reducing this belief has numerous downstream consequences including everyday outcomes as well as neural and cognitive correlates associated with a reduction of self-control. However, the exact mechanisms through which a reduction in free will belief affects self-control are still a matter of investigation. In the present registered report, we used a task switching paradigm to examine whether reducing belief in free will makes people less controlled or whether it enhances their reliance on automatic impulses. Using Bayesian sequential analysis, we failed to conceptually replicate the previous link between free will belief and cognitive control. Our registered report plan mostly accumulated substantial evidence supporting the null hypothesis. That is, diminished belief in free will does neither impact control nor automaticity. Theoretical implications of this finding are discussed.
AB - Most people believe in free will. Past research has indicated that reducing this belief has numerous downstream consequences including everyday outcomes as well as neural and cognitive correlates associated with a reduction of self-control. However, the exact mechanisms through which a reduction in free will belief affects self-control are still a matter of investigation. In the present registered report, we used a task switching paradigm to examine whether reducing belief in free will makes people less controlled or whether it enhances their reliance on automatic impulses. Using Bayesian sequential analysis, we failed to conceptually replicate the previous link between free will belief and cognitive control. Our registered report plan mostly accumulated substantial evidence supporting the null hypothesis. That is, diminished belief in free will does neither impact control nor automaticity. Theoretical implications of this finding are discussed.
KW - automaticity
KW - cognitive control
KW - free will belief
KW - self-control
KW - Business psychology
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85131861684&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/47bd8413-973b-308f-ab50-5c1f6e164fc6/
U2 - 10.1111/bjop.12578
DO - 10.1111/bjop.12578
M3 - Journal articles
C2 - 35706418
AN - SCOPUS:85131861684
VL - 113
SP - 1121
EP - 1142
JO - British Journal of Psychology
JF - British Journal of Psychology
SN - 0007-1269
IS - 4
ER -