Success of a tax amnesty: At the polls, for the fisc?
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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In: Public Choice, Vol. 72, No. 2-3, 01.12.1991, p. 131-165.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Success of a tax amnesty
T2 - At the polls, for the fisc?
AU - Pommerehne, Werner W.
AU - Zweifel, Peter
PY - 1991/12/1
Y1 - 1991/12/1
N2 - This paper provides a model for analyzing an individual's voting decision on tax amnesty and the change of his reporting behavior given amnesty is granted/rejected. Success at the polls is predicted to increase with higher penalties meted out to detected evaders while success in terms of reporting would be jeopardized. These and other implications of the model are empirically tested for two Swiss tax amnesty proposals, one rejected, the other approved by a majority of citizens/taxpayers.
AB - This paper provides a model for analyzing an individual's voting decision on tax amnesty and the change of his reporting behavior given amnesty is granted/rejected. Success at the polls is predicted to increase with higher penalties meted out to detected evaders while success in terms of reporting would be jeopardized. These and other implications of the model are empirically tested for two Swiss tax amnesty proposals, one rejected, the other approved by a majority of citizens/taxpayers.
KW - Management studies
KW - Politics
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=2442670262&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/27f7ceeb-c796-3e54-bc65-30ce10d30505/
U2 - 10.1007/BF00123742
DO - 10.1007/BF00123742
M3 - Journal articles
AN - SCOPUS:2442670262
VL - 72
SP - 131
EP - 165
JO - Public Choice
JF - Public Choice
SN - 0048-5829
IS - 2-3
ER -