Success of a tax amnesty: At the polls, for the fisc?

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Success of a tax amnesty: At the polls, for the fisc? / Pommerehne, Werner W.; Zweifel, Peter.
in: Public Choice, Jahrgang 72, Nr. 2-3, 01.12.1991, S. 131-165.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Pommerehne WW, Zweifel P. Success of a tax amnesty: At the polls, for the fisc? Public Choice. 1991 Dez 1;72(2-3):131-165. doi: 10.1007/BF00123742

Bibtex

@article{ce16214d0a1743408b32943ad390ceb0,
title = "Success of a tax amnesty: At the polls, for the fisc?",
abstract = "This paper provides a model for analyzing an individual's voting decision on tax amnesty and the change of his reporting behavior given amnesty is granted/rejected. Success at the polls is predicted to increase with higher penalties meted out to detected evaders while success in terms of reporting would be jeopardized. These and other implications of the model are empirically tested for two Swiss tax amnesty proposals, one rejected, the other approved by a majority of citizens/taxpayers.",
keywords = "Management studies, Politics",
author = "Pommerehne, {Werner W.} and Peter Zweifel",
year = "1991",
month = dec,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/BF00123742",
language = "English",
volume = "72",
pages = "131--165",
journal = "Public Choice",
issn = "0048-5829",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "2-3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Success of a tax amnesty

T2 - At the polls, for the fisc?

AU - Pommerehne, Werner W.

AU - Zweifel, Peter

PY - 1991/12/1

Y1 - 1991/12/1

N2 - This paper provides a model for analyzing an individual's voting decision on tax amnesty and the change of his reporting behavior given amnesty is granted/rejected. Success at the polls is predicted to increase with higher penalties meted out to detected evaders while success in terms of reporting would be jeopardized. These and other implications of the model are empirically tested for two Swiss tax amnesty proposals, one rejected, the other approved by a majority of citizens/taxpayers.

AB - This paper provides a model for analyzing an individual's voting decision on tax amnesty and the change of his reporting behavior given amnesty is granted/rejected. Success at the polls is predicted to increase with higher penalties meted out to detected evaders while success in terms of reporting would be jeopardized. These and other implications of the model are empirically tested for two Swiss tax amnesty proposals, one rejected, the other approved by a majority of citizens/taxpayers.

KW - Management studies

KW - Politics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=2442670262&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/27f7ceeb-c796-3e54-bc65-30ce10d30505/

U2 - 10.1007/BF00123742

DO - 10.1007/BF00123742

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:2442670262

VL - 72

SP - 131

EP - 165

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

SN - 0048-5829

IS - 2-3

ER -

DOI