Regulating High Frequency Trading: A Micro-Level Analysis of Spatial Behavior, Optimal Choices, and Pareto-Efficiency in High Speed Markets

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Regulating High Frequency Trading: A Micro-Level Analysis of Spatial Behavior, Optimal Choices, and Pareto-Efficiency in High Speed Markets. / von Müller, Camillo.
St. Gallen: University of St. Gallen, 2012. (Law and economics research paper series, working paper ; Vol. 2012, No. 4).

Research output: Working paperWorking papers

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von Müller C. Regulating High Frequency Trading: A Micro-Level Analysis of Spatial Behavior, Optimal Choices, and Pareto-Efficiency in High Speed Markets. St. Gallen: University of St. Gallen. 2012. (Law and economics research paper series, working paper ; 4).

Bibtex

@techreport{b0eda47852c4417b886b457562f93b40,
title = "Regulating High Frequency Trading: A Micro-Level Analysis of Spatial Behavior, Optimal Choices, and Pareto-Efficiency in High Speed Markets",
abstract = "The present paper considers the issue of High Frequency Trading (HFT) regulation. Rather than discussing macro-level effects of HFT that are still under debate (Sornette & Von der Becke, 2011) its analysis focuses on the issue of regulation from the perspective of HFT firms. Assuming that HFT generates benefits to firms by allowing them to trade at lower latencies than their competitors, binary choices of HFT investments yield Pareto-inefficient allocations if physical limits to latency reduction are taken into account. Adjustments in the payoff structure of the assumed model show that regulation can minimize negative externalities if the legislator is able to differentiate between market participants and their HFT strategies. The results of the alternated model indicate that legislators should be concerned about negative externalities of certain types of HFT firm behavior rather than about HFT itself. The transparency proposals of MifID II hence promise to serve as a finer tuned instrument for regulating HFT than a general financial transaction tax.",
keywords = "Economics, high frequency trading, prisoner's dilemma, regulation, von Th{\"u}nen",
author = "{von M{\"u}ller}, Camillo",
year = "2012",
language = "English",
series = "Law and economics research paper series, working paper ",
publisher = "University of St. Gallen",
number = "4",
address = "Switzerland",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "University of St. Gallen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Regulating High Frequency Trading

T2 - A Micro-Level Analysis of Spatial Behavior, Optimal Choices, and Pareto-Efficiency in High Speed Markets

AU - von Müller, Camillo

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - The present paper considers the issue of High Frequency Trading (HFT) regulation. Rather than discussing macro-level effects of HFT that are still under debate (Sornette & Von der Becke, 2011) its analysis focuses on the issue of regulation from the perspective of HFT firms. Assuming that HFT generates benefits to firms by allowing them to trade at lower latencies than their competitors, binary choices of HFT investments yield Pareto-inefficient allocations if physical limits to latency reduction are taken into account. Adjustments in the payoff structure of the assumed model show that regulation can minimize negative externalities if the legislator is able to differentiate between market participants and their HFT strategies. The results of the alternated model indicate that legislators should be concerned about negative externalities of certain types of HFT firm behavior rather than about HFT itself. The transparency proposals of MifID II hence promise to serve as a finer tuned instrument for regulating HFT than a general financial transaction tax.

AB - The present paper considers the issue of High Frequency Trading (HFT) regulation. Rather than discussing macro-level effects of HFT that are still under debate (Sornette & Von der Becke, 2011) its analysis focuses on the issue of regulation from the perspective of HFT firms. Assuming that HFT generates benefits to firms by allowing them to trade at lower latencies than their competitors, binary choices of HFT investments yield Pareto-inefficient allocations if physical limits to latency reduction are taken into account. Adjustments in the payoff structure of the assumed model show that regulation can minimize negative externalities if the legislator is able to differentiate between market participants and their HFT strategies. The results of the alternated model indicate that legislators should be concerned about negative externalities of certain types of HFT firm behavior rather than about HFT itself. The transparency proposals of MifID II hence promise to serve as a finer tuned instrument for regulating HFT than a general financial transaction tax.

KW - Economics

KW - high frequency trading

KW - prisoner's dilemma

KW - regulation

KW - von Thünen

M3 - Working papers

T3 - Law and economics research paper series, working paper

BT - Regulating High Frequency Trading

PB - University of St. Gallen

CY - St. Gallen

ER -