Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions
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In: Economics Letters, Vol. 121, No. 1, 01.10.2013, p. 128-132.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes
T2 - Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions
AU - Enkelmann, S.
AU - Leibrecht, Markus
PY - 2013/10/1
Y1 - 2013/10/1
N2 - We analyze electorally motivated public spending using disaggregated expenditure data. Election cycles in total expenditures and in specific sub-categories mainly exist in newly democratized Eastern European countries. However, electorally motivated spending policies are ineffective means to enhance the re-election probability.
AB - We analyze electorally motivated public spending using disaggregated expenditure data. Election cycles in total expenditures and in specific sub-categories mainly exist in newly democratized Eastern European countries. However, electorally motivated spending policies are ineffective means to enhance the re-election probability.
KW - Economics
KW - COFOG
KW - Political economy
KW - Political expenditure cycle
KW - Re-election probability
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84882743889&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.015
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.015
M3 - Journal articles
AN - SCOPUS:84882743889
VL - 121
SP - 128
EP - 132
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
IS - 1
ER -