Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

Standard

Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions. / Enkelmann, S.; Leibrecht, Markus.
in: Economics Letters, Jahrgang 121, Nr. 1, 01.10.2013, S. 128-132.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Bibtex

@article{ddf6d57b185d4abab9d6bd8b541721bc,
title = "Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions",
abstract = "We analyze electorally motivated public spending using disaggregated expenditure data. Election cycles in total expenditures and in specific sub-categories mainly exist in newly democratized Eastern European countries. However, electorally motivated spending policies are ineffective means to enhance the re-election probability.",
keywords = "Economics, COFOG, Political economy, Political expenditure cycle, Re-election probability",
author = "S. Enkelmann and Markus Leibrecht",
year = "2013",
month = oct,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.015",
language = "English",
volume = "121",
pages = "128--132",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes

T2 - Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions

AU - Enkelmann, S.

AU - Leibrecht, Markus

PY - 2013/10/1

Y1 - 2013/10/1

N2 - We analyze electorally motivated public spending using disaggregated expenditure data. Election cycles in total expenditures and in specific sub-categories mainly exist in newly democratized Eastern European countries. However, electorally motivated spending policies are ineffective means to enhance the re-election probability.

AB - We analyze electorally motivated public spending using disaggregated expenditure data. Election cycles in total expenditures and in specific sub-categories mainly exist in newly democratized Eastern European countries. However, electorally motivated spending policies are ineffective means to enhance the re-election probability.

KW - Economics

KW - COFOG

KW - Political economy

KW - Political expenditure cycle

KW - Re-election probability

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84882743889&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.015

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.015

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:84882743889

VL - 121

SP - 128

EP - 132

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 1

ER -

DOI