Discovering cooperation: a contractual approach to institutional change in regional international organizations

Gary Marks; Tobias Lenz; Besir Ceka; Brian Burgoon

Discovering cooperation: a contractual approach to institutional change in regional international organizations

Research output: Working paper › Working papers

Standard

Discovering cooperation: a contractual approach to institutional change in regional international organizations. / Marks, Gary; Lenz, Tobias; Ceka, Besir et al.
San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 2014. (EUI Working Paper RSCAS; Vol. 2014, No. 65).

Research output: Working paper › Working papers

Harvard

Marks, G, Lenz, T, Ceka, B & Burgoon, B 2014 'Discovering cooperation: a contractual approach to institutional change in regional international organizations' EUI Working Paper RSCAS, no. 65, vol. 2014, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole. <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/31551>

APA

Marks, G., Lenz, T., Ceka, B., & Burgoon, B. (2014). Discovering cooperation: a contractual approach to institutional change in regional international organizations. (EUI Working Paper RSCAS; Vol. 2014, No. 65). European University Institute. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/31551

Vancouver

Marks G, Lenz T, Ceka B, Burgoon B. Discovering cooperation: a contractual approach to institutional change in regional international organizations. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute. 2014. (EUI Working Paper RSCAS; 65).

Bibtex

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title = "Discovering cooperation: a contractual approach to institutional change in regional international organizations",

abstract = "This paper offers a fresh perspective on institutional change drawing on recent advances in the economic theory of contracting. Contractual incompleteness enhances organizational flexibility, but only at the cost of perceptual ambiguity. We hypothesize that the willingness to engage in a highly incomplete contract depends on shared understandings which reduce the cost of perceptual ambiguity. These claims are evaluated using a new dataset on delegation of state authority to non-state actors in 35 regional international organizations from 1950 to 2010. We are able to confirm across a wide range of models and specifications that reform is guided by contractual incompleteness and that contractual incompleteness is rooted in shared historical experience.",

keywords = "Politics, regional international organizations, contracting, institutional cooperation, institutional change",

author = "Gary Marks and Tobias Lenz and Besir Ceka and Brian Burgoon",

year = "2014",

language = "English",

series = "EUI Working Paper RSCAS",

publisher = "European University Institute",

number = "65",

address = "Italy",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "European University Institute",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Discovering cooperation

T2 - a contractual approach to institutional change in regional international organizations

AU - Marks, Gary

AU - Lenz, Tobias

AU - Ceka, Besir

AU - Burgoon, Brian

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - This paper offers a fresh perspective on institutional change drawing on recent advances in the economic theory of contracting. Contractual incompleteness enhances organizational flexibility, but only at the cost of perceptual ambiguity. We hypothesize that the willingness to engage in a highly incomplete contract depends on shared understandings which reduce the cost of perceptual ambiguity. These claims are evaluated using a new dataset on delegation of state authority to non-state actors in 35 regional international organizations from 1950 to 2010. We are able to confirm across a wide range of models and specifications that reform is guided by contractual incompleteness and that contractual incompleteness is rooted in shared historical experience.

AB - This paper offers a fresh perspective on institutional change drawing on recent advances in the economic theory of contracting. Contractual incompleteness enhances organizational flexibility, but only at the cost of perceptual ambiguity. We hypothesize that the willingness to engage in a highly incomplete contract depends on shared understandings which reduce the cost of perceptual ambiguity. These claims are evaluated using a new dataset on delegation of state authority to non-state actors in 35 regional international organizations from 1950 to 2010. We are able to confirm across a wide range of models and specifications that reform is guided by contractual incompleteness and that contractual incompleteness is rooted in shared historical experience.

KW - Politics

KW - regional international organizations

KW - contracting

KW - institutional cooperation

KW - institutional change

M3 - Working papers

T3 - EUI Working Paper RSCAS

BT - Discovering cooperation

PB - European University Institute

CY - San Domenico di Fiesole

ER -