Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia. Michel Foucault’s Questioning of The Concepts of Person and Humanity in Kant’s Works
Research output: Contributions to collected editions/works › Chapter › peer-review
Authors
According to Foucault, man as a historical ‘event’ that disappears like a face in the sand cannot be seen as the starting point, foundation, and guarantor of thought and morality. In contrast, at the centre of Kant’s moral thought is his concept of the human being as an ‘end in itself’ (4:429) and of human dignity as well as the human being’s capacity for autonomy and freedom, aspects that essentially determine Kant’s philosophical concept. Foucault emphasises the constructiveness of the subject and its relations to knowledge and power. Although Foucault rejects Kant’s theorems of man, humanity, person, and personality and his teleological concept of history of cosmopolitan orientation, he remains fascinated by Kant’s concepts of critique - understood as parrhesia - and enlightenment. His conception of the subject continues to be based on the aspects of human freedom and autonomy and does not completely abandon the Kantian roots. Foucault therefore appears as a philosopher of the threshold who does not create new epistemes.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | The Kantian Subject : New Interpretative Essays |
Editors | Fernando M. F. Silva, Luigi Caranti |
Number of pages | 11 |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis Inc. |
Publication date | 23.10.2023 |
Pages | 132-142 |
ISBN (print) | 9781032521930 |
ISBN (electronic) | 9781003800866, 9781003462415 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 23.10.2023 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 selection and editorial matter, Fernando M. F. Silva and Luigi Caranti.
- Philosophy
- Science of art