Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia. Michel Foucault’s Questioning of The Concepts of Person and Humanity in Kant’s Works

Research output: Contributions to collected editions/worksChapterpeer-review

Authors

  • Marita Rainsborough

According to Foucault, man as a historical ‘event’ that disappears like a face in the sand cannot be seen as the starting point, foundation, and guarantor of thought and morality. In contrast, at the centre of Kant’s moral thought is his concept of the human being as an ‘end in itself’ (4:429) and of human dignity as well as the human being’s capacity for autonomy and freedom, aspects that essentially determine Kant’s philosophical concept. Foucault emphasises the constructiveness of the subject and its relations to knowledge and power. Although Foucault rejects Kant’s theorems of man, humanity, person, and personality and his teleological concept of history of cosmopolitan orientation, he remains fascinated by Kant’s concepts of critique - understood as parrhesia - and enlightenment. His conception of the subject continues to be based on the aspects of human freedom and autonomy and does not completely abandon the Kantian roots. Foucault therefore appears as a philosopher of the threshold who does not create new epistemes.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Kantian Subject : New Interpretative Essays
EditorsFernando M. F. Silva, Luigi Caranti
Number of pages11
PublisherTaylor and Francis Inc.
Publication date23.10.2023
Pages132-142
ISBN (Print)9781032521930
ISBN (Electronic)9781003800866, 9781003462415
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 23.10.2023

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 selection and editorial matter, Fernando M. F. Silva and Luigi Caranti.

DOI