Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia. Michel Foucault’s Questioning of The Concepts of Person and Humanity in Kant’s Works
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The Kantian Subject: New Interpretative Essays. ed. / Fernando M. F. Silva; Luigi Caranti. Taylor and Francis Inc., 2023. p. 132-142.
Research output: Contributions to collected editions/works › Chapter › peer-review
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TY - CHAP
T1 - Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia.
T2 - Michel Foucault’s Questioning of The Concepts of Person and Humanity in Kant’s Works
AU - Rainsborough, Marita
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Fernando M. F. Silva and Luigi Caranti.
PY - 2023/10/23
Y1 - 2023/10/23
N2 - According to Foucault, man as a historical ‘event’ that disappears like a face in the sand cannot be seen as the starting point, foundation, and guarantor of thought and morality. In contrast, at the centre of Kant’s moral thought is his concept of the human being as an ‘end in itself’ (4:429) and of human dignity as well as the human being’s capacity for autonomy and freedom, aspects that essentially determine Kant’s philosophical concept. Foucault emphasises the constructiveness of the subject and its relations to knowledge and power. Although Foucault rejects Kant’s theorems of man, humanity, person, and personality and his teleological concept of history of cosmopolitan orientation, he remains fascinated by Kant’s concepts of critique - understood as parrhesia - and enlightenment. His conception of the subject continues to be based on the aspects of human freedom and autonomy and does not completely abandon the Kantian roots. Foucault therefore appears as a philosopher of the threshold who does not create new epistemes.
AB - According to Foucault, man as a historical ‘event’ that disappears like a face in the sand cannot be seen as the starting point, foundation, and guarantor of thought and morality. In contrast, at the centre of Kant’s moral thought is his concept of the human being as an ‘end in itself’ (4:429) and of human dignity as well as the human being’s capacity for autonomy and freedom, aspects that essentially determine Kant’s philosophical concept. Foucault emphasises the constructiveness of the subject and its relations to knowledge and power. Although Foucault rejects Kant’s theorems of man, humanity, person, and personality and his teleological concept of history of cosmopolitan orientation, he remains fascinated by Kant’s concepts of critique - understood as parrhesia - and enlightenment. His conception of the subject continues to be based on the aspects of human freedom and autonomy and does not completely abandon the Kantian roots. Foucault therefore appears as a philosopher of the threshold who does not create new epistemes.
KW - Philosophy
KW - Science of art
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85177510238&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/fa3a7789-33ab-33e9-812e-6bde4b766ac7/
U2 - 10.4324/9781003462415-11
DO - 10.4324/9781003462415-11
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85177510238
SN - 9781032521930
SP - 132
EP - 142
BT - The Kantian Subject
A2 - Silva, Fernando M. F.
A2 - Caranti, Luigi
PB - Taylor and Francis Inc.
ER -