Cartel behaviour and efficient sanctioning by criminal sentences
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In: European Competition Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, 03.2021, p. 309-352.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Cartel behaviour and efficient sanctioning by criminal sentences
AU - Wein, Thomas
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2021/3
Y1 - 2021/3
N2 - Hardcore cartels risk receiving both administrative fines from the cartel authority and civil law claims for damages. There is a legal policy discussion that cartelist should also face criminal law consequences. Penalties must be at least as high as expected benefits to deter crimes. Sanctions by the German cartel office might indicate information on the profits We calculate the minimum level of fines required to deter cartel infringement for each case, and compare the figures to the actual penalties. The calculated minimum penalties would result in a considerable increase in fines, which would have to be covered either by compensation payments, or criminal sanctions. If custodial sentences were based on the probability of zero compensation payments, and the monetary loss of benefit, the result would sometimes equal an impractically long criminal sentence. It would be more effective to raise administrative sanctions to a sufficient level, especially against individuals.
AB - Hardcore cartels risk receiving both administrative fines from the cartel authority and civil law claims for damages. There is a legal policy discussion that cartelist should also face criminal law consequences. Penalties must be at least as high as expected benefits to deter crimes. Sanctions by the German cartel office might indicate information on the profits We calculate the minimum level of fines required to deter cartel infringement for each case, and compare the figures to the actual penalties. The calculated minimum penalties would result in a considerable increase in fines, which would have to be covered either by compensation payments, or criminal sanctions. If custodial sentences were based on the probability of zero compensation payments, and the monetary loss of benefit, the result would sometimes equal an impractically long criminal sentence. It would be more effective to raise administrative sanctions to a sufficient level, especially against individuals.
KW - Economics
KW - hard-core-cartels
KW - deterrence
KW - criminal penalty
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85101879840&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/17441056.2021.1886442
DO - 10.1080/17441056.2021.1886442
M3 - Journal articles
VL - 17
SP - 309
EP - 352
JO - European Competition Journal
JF - European Competition Journal
SN - 1744-1056
IS - 2
ER -