Cartel behaviour and efficient sanctioning by criminal sentences

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Cartel behaviour and efficient sanctioning by criminal sentences. / Wein, Thomas.
In: European Competition Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, 03.2021, p. 309-352.

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Wein T. Cartel behaviour and efficient sanctioning by criminal sentences. European Competition Journal. 2021 Mar;17(2):309-352. Epub 2021 Feb 28. doi: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1886442

Bibtex

@article{576dcff7238d463fb3133084f93eedef,
title = "Cartel behaviour and efficient sanctioning by criminal sentences",
abstract = "Hardcore cartels risk receiving both administrative fines from the cartel authority and civil law claims for damages. There is a legal policy discussion that cartelist should also face criminal law consequences. Penalties must be at least as high as expected benefits to deter crimes. Sanctions by the German cartel office might indicate information on the profits We calculate the minimum level of fines required to deter cartel infringement for each case, and compare the figures to the actual penalties. The calculated minimum penalties would result in a considerable increase in fines, which would have to be covered either by compensation payments, or criminal sanctions. If custodial sentences were based on the probability of zero compensation payments, and the monetary loss of benefit, the result would sometimes equal an impractically long criminal sentence. It would be more effective to raise administrative sanctions to a sufficient level, especially against individuals.",
keywords = "Economics, hard-core-cartels, deterrence, criminal penalty",
author = "Thomas Wein",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.",
year = "2021",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1080/17441056.2021.1886442",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "309--352",
journal = "European Competition Journal",
issn = "1744-1056",
publisher = "Taylor & Francis",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Cartel behaviour and efficient sanctioning by criminal sentences

AU - Wein, Thomas

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

PY - 2021/3

Y1 - 2021/3

N2 - Hardcore cartels risk receiving both administrative fines from the cartel authority and civil law claims for damages. There is a legal policy discussion that cartelist should also face criminal law consequences. Penalties must be at least as high as expected benefits to deter crimes. Sanctions by the German cartel office might indicate information on the profits We calculate the minimum level of fines required to deter cartel infringement for each case, and compare the figures to the actual penalties. The calculated minimum penalties would result in a considerable increase in fines, which would have to be covered either by compensation payments, or criminal sanctions. If custodial sentences were based on the probability of zero compensation payments, and the monetary loss of benefit, the result would sometimes equal an impractically long criminal sentence. It would be more effective to raise administrative sanctions to a sufficient level, especially against individuals.

AB - Hardcore cartels risk receiving both administrative fines from the cartel authority and civil law claims for damages. There is a legal policy discussion that cartelist should also face criminal law consequences. Penalties must be at least as high as expected benefits to deter crimes. Sanctions by the German cartel office might indicate information on the profits We calculate the minimum level of fines required to deter cartel infringement for each case, and compare the figures to the actual penalties. The calculated minimum penalties would result in a considerable increase in fines, which would have to be covered either by compensation payments, or criminal sanctions. If custodial sentences were based on the probability of zero compensation payments, and the monetary loss of benefit, the result would sometimes equal an impractically long criminal sentence. It would be more effective to raise administrative sanctions to a sufficient level, especially against individuals.

KW - Economics

KW - hard-core-cartels

KW - deterrence

KW - criminal penalty

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85101879840&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/17441056.2021.1886442

DO - 10.1080/17441056.2021.1886442

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 17

SP - 309

EP - 352

JO - European Competition Journal

JF - European Competition Journal

SN - 1744-1056

IS - 2

ER -