An empirical examination of repeated auctions for biodiversity conservation contracts
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An empirical examination of repeated auctions for biodiversity conservation contracts. / Groth, Markus.
Lüneburg : Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, 2008. (Working paper series in economics; No. 78).Research output: Working paper › Working papers
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TY - UNPB
T1 - An empirical examination of repeated auctions for biodiversity conservation contracts
AU - Groth, Markus
N1 - Literaturverz. S. 17 - 19
PY - 2008
Y1 - 2008
N2 - The European Union’s Council Regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development has introduced auctioning as a new instrument for granting agri-environmental payments and awarding conservation contracts for the recent multi-annual budgetary plan. This paper therefore deals with the conception and results of two case study auctions for conservation contracts. Results of two field experiments show much differentiated bid prices in the model-region and budgetary cost-effectiveness gains of up to 21% in the first auction and up to 36% in the repeated auction. Besides these promising results, some critical aspects as well as lessons to be learned will also be discussed in this paper to improve the design and performance of upcoming conservation auctions.
AB - The European Union’s Council Regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development has introduced auctioning as a new instrument for granting agri-environmental payments and awarding conservation contracts for the recent multi-annual budgetary plan. This paper therefore deals with the conception and results of two case study auctions for conservation contracts. Results of two field experiments show much differentiated bid prices in the model-region and budgetary cost-effectiveness gains of up to 21% in the first auction and up to 36% in the repeated auction. Besides these promising results, some critical aspects as well as lessons to be learned will also be discussed in this paper to improve the design and performance of upcoming conservation auctions.
KW - Economics
KW - agri-environmental policy
KW - discriminatory-price auction
KW - multi-unit auction
KW - ecological services
KW - plant biodiversity
KW - experimental economics
M3 - Working papers
T3 - Working paper series in economics
BT - An empirical examination of repeated auctions for biodiversity conservation contracts
PB - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg
CY - Lüneburg
ER -