Promoting Prevention Success at the Bargaining Table: Regulatory Focus in Distributive Negotiations

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Promoting Prevention Success at the Bargaining Table : Regulatory Focus in Distributive Negotiations. / Trötschel, Roman; Bündgens, S.; Hüffmeier, Joachim et al.

in: Journal of Economic Psychology, Jahrgang 38, 10.2013, S. 26-39.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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@article{15b403cfc19d4293a30eaf3920c3eb0a,
title = "Promoting Prevention Success at the Bargaining Table: Regulatory Focus in Distributive Negotiations",
abstract = "While promotion-focused individuals conceptualize goals as ideals and opportunities, prevention-focused individuals conceptualize goals as obligations and necessities. Due to these different goal conceptualizations, prevention-focused parties are expected to set the framework for agreements in distributive business-negotiations among parties with different regulatory foci: Specifically, we predict that prevention-focused negotiators reveal a high resistance to concede until their goals are met, but are willing to concede once their goals are fulfilled. In contrast, promotion-focused parties should adjust their concession making to the best attainable outcomes, irrespective of their negotiation goals. Two studies supported these theoretical assumptions: Prevention-focused parties with goals located in the upper range (i.e., high goals) of the 'zone of possible agreements' (ZOPA; e.g., Sebenius, 1992) revealed a high resistance to concede. Hence, they outperformed promotion-focused counterparts-irrespective of whether the latter held low (Study 1) or equally high (Study 2) goals. Conversely, prevention-focused parties with goals located in the lower range of the ZOPA (i.e., low goals) revealed a lower resistance to concede. Hence, they were outperformed by their promotion-focused counterparts-irrespective of whether the latter held equally low (Study 1) or high (Study 2) goals. The findings are discussed with respect to the role of self-regulation and goal conceptualization in the context of negotiations.",
keywords = "Psychology, Negotiation, Prevention, Regulatory focus, Self-regulation, Buyer, Seller",
author = "Roman Tr{\"o}tschel and S. B{\"u}ndgens and Joachim H{\"u}ffmeier and Loschelder, {David Demian}",
year = "2013",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1016/j.joep.2012.03.006",
language = "English",
volume = "38",
pages = "26--39",
journal = "Journal of Economic Psychology",
issn = "0167-4870",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Promoting Prevention Success at the Bargaining Table

T2 - Regulatory Focus in Distributive Negotiations

AU - Trötschel, Roman

AU - Bündgens, S.

AU - Hüffmeier, Joachim

AU - Loschelder, David Demian

PY - 2013/10

Y1 - 2013/10

N2 - While promotion-focused individuals conceptualize goals as ideals and opportunities, prevention-focused individuals conceptualize goals as obligations and necessities. Due to these different goal conceptualizations, prevention-focused parties are expected to set the framework for agreements in distributive business-negotiations among parties with different regulatory foci: Specifically, we predict that prevention-focused negotiators reveal a high resistance to concede until their goals are met, but are willing to concede once their goals are fulfilled. In contrast, promotion-focused parties should adjust their concession making to the best attainable outcomes, irrespective of their negotiation goals. Two studies supported these theoretical assumptions: Prevention-focused parties with goals located in the upper range (i.e., high goals) of the 'zone of possible agreements' (ZOPA; e.g., Sebenius, 1992) revealed a high resistance to concede. Hence, they outperformed promotion-focused counterparts-irrespective of whether the latter held low (Study 1) or equally high (Study 2) goals. Conversely, prevention-focused parties with goals located in the lower range of the ZOPA (i.e., low goals) revealed a lower resistance to concede. Hence, they were outperformed by their promotion-focused counterparts-irrespective of whether the latter held equally low (Study 1) or high (Study 2) goals. The findings are discussed with respect to the role of self-regulation and goal conceptualization in the context of negotiations.

AB - While promotion-focused individuals conceptualize goals as ideals and opportunities, prevention-focused individuals conceptualize goals as obligations and necessities. Due to these different goal conceptualizations, prevention-focused parties are expected to set the framework for agreements in distributive business-negotiations among parties with different regulatory foci: Specifically, we predict that prevention-focused negotiators reveal a high resistance to concede until their goals are met, but are willing to concede once their goals are fulfilled. In contrast, promotion-focused parties should adjust their concession making to the best attainable outcomes, irrespective of their negotiation goals. Two studies supported these theoretical assumptions: Prevention-focused parties with goals located in the upper range (i.e., high goals) of the 'zone of possible agreements' (ZOPA; e.g., Sebenius, 1992) revealed a high resistance to concede. Hence, they outperformed promotion-focused counterparts-irrespective of whether the latter held low (Study 1) or equally high (Study 2) goals. Conversely, prevention-focused parties with goals located in the lower range of the ZOPA (i.e., low goals) revealed a lower resistance to concede. Hence, they were outperformed by their promotion-focused counterparts-irrespective of whether the latter held equally low (Study 1) or high (Study 2) goals. The findings are discussed with respect to the role of self-regulation and goal conceptualization in the context of negotiations.

KW - Psychology

KW - Negotiation

KW - Prevention

KW - Regulatory focus

KW - Self-regulation

KW - Buyer

KW - Seller

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84880328390&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.joep.2012.03.006

DO - 10.1016/j.joep.2012.03.006

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 38

SP - 26

EP - 39

JO - Journal of Economic Psychology

JF - Journal of Economic Psychology

SN - 0167-4870

ER -

DOI