TY - JOUR

T1 - Neutralism, Perfectionism and Respect for Persons

AU - Schefczyk, Michael

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Neutralism, which is roughly speaking the doctrine that the state should not implement orpromote ideals of the good life (Barry 1965/1970, 69ff.; Raz 1986, 110ff.; Sher 1997, 34), is abroad church. It ranges from a purist commitment to full self-ownership as the fundamentalmoral right, which we find in libertarianism (Nozick 1974/1999; Van Parijs 1995; for a criticaldiscussion Wall 2009), to more nuanced views prevailing in liberal egalitarianism (Rawls 1993;Larmore 1996; Rawls 2001), libertarian paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) or in John StuartMill’s version of utilitarian liberalism (Mill 1863/1969).In contrast to Sher’s declaration that “neutralism is false” (1997, 3), I shall argue that neutralstates can do a lot in order to promote the good life of the residents. A plausible form ofneutralism does not exclude perfectionist reasons tout court from political deliberation. However,the role of perfectionist reasons in political affairs must be framed by an appropriately conceivedprinciple of neutrality. Unlike Sher, I argue that one can take a perfectionist theory of the goodand most of Sher’s political concerns aboard without sacrificing the principle of neutrality.Contrary to other forms of moderate neutralism (e.g. Weinstock 1999) or mild perfectionism (e.g.Chan 2000), my approach rests on the idea that respect for autonomously chosen (decent)reasons constitutes a constraint on the scope of perfectionist intervention.

AB - Neutralism, which is roughly speaking the doctrine that the state should not implement orpromote ideals of the good life (Barry 1965/1970, 69ff.; Raz 1986, 110ff.; Sher 1997, 34), is abroad church. It ranges from a purist commitment to full self-ownership as the fundamentalmoral right, which we find in libertarianism (Nozick 1974/1999; Van Parijs 1995; for a criticaldiscussion Wall 2009), to more nuanced views prevailing in liberal egalitarianism (Rawls 1993;Larmore 1996; Rawls 2001), libertarian paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) or in John StuartMill’s version of utilitarian liberalism (Mill 1863/1969).In contrast to Sher’s declaration that “neutralism is false” (1997, 3), I shall argue that neutralstates can do a lot in order to promote the good life of the residents. A plausible form ofneutralism does not exclude perfectionist reasons tout court from political deliberation. However,the role of perfectionist reasons in political affairs must be framed by an appropriately conceivedprinciple of neutrality. Unlike Sher, I argue that one can take a perfectionist theory of the goodand most of Sher’s political concerns aboard without sacrificing the principle of neutrality.Contrary to other forms of moderate neutralism (e.g. Weinstock 1999) or mild perfectionism (e.g.Chan 2000), my approach rests on the idea that respect for autonomously chosen (decent)reasons constitutes a constraint on the scope of perfectionist intervention.

KW - Philosophy

KW - Politics

U2 - 10.2143/EP.19.3.2172302

DO - 10.2143/EP.19.3.2172302

M3 - Comments / Debate / Reports

VL - 19

SP - 535

EP - 546

JO - Ethical Perspectives

JF - Ethical Perspectives

SN - 1370-0049

IS - 3

ER -