Memory Acts: Memory without Representation. Theoretical and Methodological Suggestions

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Memory Acts: Memory without Representation. Theoretical and Methodological Suggestions. / Hobuß, Steffi.
LUND: Centre for European Studies at Lund University, 2013. (ISTME Working Paper; Nr. 1/2013).

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Hobuß S. Memory Acts: Memory without Representation. Theoretical and Methodological Suggestions. LUND: Centre for European Studies at Lund University. 2013. (ISTME Working Paper; 1/2013).

Bibtex

@techreport{e86fa11bf4264150bf52710e3495b88c,
title = "Memory Acts: Memory without Representation.: Theoretical and Methodological Suggestions",
abstract = "In the paper I use arguments from Ludwig Wittgenstein, John L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler and the ethnologist Johannes Fabian to show how the concepts of collective memory, of speech acts and of performativity can help to formulate some ideas about what a theory of and research about transcultural European memory can deal with. The positions of speakers or agents and the question of responsibility play a fundamental role in this argument.Analysing the contextual uses of memory acts will allow not only going beyond the sharp binaries between the individual and the collective and between the national and the global, but also beyond the binary between history- as-it-was and memory. In his so-called private language argument, Wittgenstein argues against theories of meaning that attempt to define the meaning of language in terms of private, mental acts. His argument is to be read as a reductio ad absurdum of the idea of a private memory and of the possibility of private language meaning as well. Furthermore, Wittgenstein argues against theories of representation in regard to explain linguistic and cultural meaning. His argument will be combined with Austin{\textquoteright}s theory of speech acts and Butler{\textquoteright}s concept of performativity in order to suggest the notion of memory acts. I would suggest that instead of holding on to the distinction between various kinds of memory cases, further research should give more attention to different aspects of memory acts and should avoid talking about representation when explaining the uses of memory. A Wittgensteinian-Austinian stance can possibly help to analyse the dynamics of “representation” of migrants{\textquoteright} memory in the media, the relation between power and memory, and the problem of European memory in relation to the issue of old and new boundaries. The abdication of the master concept of representation will help to examine the present and future of memory negotiation, transmission and construction, not just the past, and to develop first steps of a theory about the relation between memory and truth.",
keywords = "Philosophy",
author = "Steffi Hobu{\ss}",
note = "ISTME Working paper 1/2013",
year = "2013",
language = "English",
series = "ISTME Working Paper",
publisher = "Centre for European Studies at Lund University",
number = "1/2013",
address = "Sweden",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Centre for European Studies at Lund University",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Memory Acts: Memory without Representation.

T2 - Theoretical and Methodological Suggestions

AU - Hobuß, Steffi

N1 - ISTME Working paper 1/2013

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - In the paper I use arguments from Ludwig Wittgenstein, John L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler and the ethnologist Johannes Fabian to show how the concepts of collective memory, of speech acts and of performativity can help to formulate some ideas about what a theory of and research about transcultural European memory can deal with. The positions of speakers or agents and the question of responsibility play a fundamental role in this argument.Analysing the contextual uses of memory acts will allow not only going beyond the sharp binaries between the individual and the collective and between the national and the global, but also beyond the binary between history- as-it-was and memory. In his so-called private language argument, Wittgenstein argues against theories of meaning that attempt to define the meaning of language in terms of private, mental acts. His argument is to be read as a reductio ad absurdum of the idea of a private memory and of the possibility of private language meaning as well. Furthermore, Wittgenstein argues against theories of representation in regard to explain linguistic and cultural meaning. His argument will be combined with Austin’s theory of speech acts and Butler’s concept of performativity in order to suggest the notion of memory acts. I would suggest that instead of holding on to the distinction between various kinds of memory cases, further research should give more attention to different aspects of memory acts and should avoid talking about representation when explaining the uses of memory. A Wittgensteinian-Austinian stance can possibly help to analyse the dynamics of “representation” of migrants’ memory in the media, the relation between power and memory, and the problem of European memory in relation to the issue of old and new boundaries. The abdication of the master concept of representation will help to examine the present and future of memory negotiation, transmission and construction, not just the past, and to develop first steps of a theory about the relation between memory and truth.

AB - In the paper I use arguments from Ludwig Wittgenstein, John L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler and the ethnologist Johannes Fabian to show how the concepts of collective memory, of speech acts and of performativity can help to formulate some ideas about what a theory of and research about transcultural European memory can deal with. The positions of speakers or agents and the question of responsibility play a fundamental role in this argument.Analysing the contextual uses of memory acts will allow not only going beyond the sharp binaries between the individual and the collective and between the national and the global, but also beyond the binary between history- as-it-was and memory. In his so-called private language argument, Wittgenstein argues against theories of meaning that attempt to define the meaning of language in terms of private, mental acts. His argument is to be read as a reductio ad absurdum of the idea of a private memory and of the possibility of private language meaning as well. Furthermore, Wittgenstein argues against theories of representation in regard to explain linguistic and cultural meaning. His argument will be combined with Austin’s theory of speech acts and Butler’s concept of performativity in order to suggest the notion of memory acts. I would suggest that instead of holding on to the distinction between various kinds of memory cases, further research should give more attention to different aspects of memory acts and should avoid talking about representation when explaining the uses of memory. A Wittgensteinian-Austinian stance can possibly help to analyse the dynamics of “representation” of migrants’ memory in the media, the relation between power and memory, and the problem of European memory in relation to the issue of old and new boundaries. The abdication of the master concept of representation will help to examine the present and future of memory negotiation, transmission and construction, not just the past, and to develop first steps of a theory about the relation between memory and truth.

KW - Philosophy

M3 - Working papers

T3 - ISTME Working Paper

BT - Memory Acts: Memory without Representation.

PB - Centre for European Studies at Lund University

CY - LUND

ER -

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